Public goods, Conditional cooperation, Monetary punishments, Non-monetary punishments, Moral suasion, Sorting, C71, C91, C92,

No abstract

Corruption, Experiments, Subject pool effects, C91, D73, O12, K42,

We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the ‘Minimum Effort Game’ which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto‐ranked equilibria. The game is played by non‐overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter‐generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff‐dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge.

What determines our views on taxation and crime, healthcare and religion, welfare and gender roles? And why do opinions about these seemingly disparate aspects of our social lives coalesce the way they do? Research over the last 50 years has suggested that political attitudes and values around the globe are shaped by two ideological dimensions, often referred to as economic and social conservatism. However, it remains unclear why this ideological structure exists. Here, we highlight the striking concordance between these two dimensions of ideology and two key aspects of human sociality: cooperation and group conformity. Humans cooperate to a greater degree than our great ape relatives, paying personal costs to benefit others. Humans also conform to group-wide social norms and punish norm violators in interdependent, culturally marked groups. Together, these two shifts in sociality are posited to have driven the emergence of large-scale complex human societies. We argue that fitness trade-offs and behavioural plasticity have maintained strategic individual differences in both cooperation and group conformity, naturally giving rise to the two dimensions of political ideology. Supported by evidence from psychology, behavioural genetics, behavioural economics, and primatology, this evolutionary framework promises novel insight into the biological and cultural basis of political ideology.

No abstract

A substantial body of recent research looks at differences in the behavior of men and women in diverse economic transactions. We contribute to this literature by investigating gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem. Our study departs from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using economic experiments. Based on data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Singapore, we show that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, no significant gender differences are seen in India, Indonesia, and Singapore. Hence, our findings suggest that the gender differences reported in previous studies may not be as universal as stated, and may be more culture specific. We also explore behavioral differences by gender across countries and find larger variations in women's behavior toward corruption than in men's across the countries in our sample.

1What determines our views on taxation and crime, healthcare and religion, welfare and 2 gender roles? And why do opinions about these seemingly disparate aspects of our social 3 lives coalesce the way they do? Research over the last 50 years has suggested that political 4 attitudes and values around the globe are shaped by two ideological dimensions, often 5 referred to as economic and social conservatism. However, it remains unclear why this 6 ideological structure exists. Here, we highlight the striking concordance between these two 7 dimensions of ideology and two key aspects of human sociality: cooperation and group 8 conformity. Humans cooperate to a greater degree than our great ape relatives, paying 9 personal costs to benefit others. Humans also conform to group-wide social norms and punish 10 norm violators in interdependent, culturally marked groups. Together, these two shifts in 11 sociality are posited to have driven the emergence of large-scale complex human societies. 12 We argue that fitness trade-offs and behavioural plasticity have maintained strategic 13 individual differences in both cooperation and group conformity, naturally giving rise to the 14 two dimensions of political ideology. Supported by evidence from psychology, behavioural 15 genetics, behavioural economics, and primatology, this evolutionary framework promises 16 novel insight into the biological and cultural basis of political ideology. 17 18