Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Graziano, Sara; Maitra, Pushkar

doi:10.2139/ssrn.580481

Cited by 57 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…Schotter (2003) reviews the first studies on advice giving and finding that advice changes behavior of the "advice takers", i.e., subjects who have taken advice play the same game differently than the advice givers. Chaudhuri et al (2006) report that advice -given as free-form text messages by individuals -increase contributions in a public good experiment (and mitigates free-riding) if the advice is made public and becomes common knowledge. In their influential trust game study, Berg et al (1995) find that a social history treatment -compared to the 2 For details of the information presented in the social history see Section 2.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Gürerk

2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Endogenously chosen punishment institutions perform well in increasing contributions and long-term payoffs in social dilemma situations. However, they suffer from (a) initial reluctance of subjects to join the punishment institution and (b) initial efficiency losses due to frequent punishment. Here, we investigate the effects of social learning on the acceptence and the efficieny of a peer punishment institution in a community choice experiment. Subjects choose between communities with and without the possibility to punish peers before interacting in a repeated social dilemma situation. We find that providing participants with a social history -presenting the main results of an identical previous experiment conducted with different subjects -decreases the initial reluctance towards the punishment institution significantly. Moreover, with social history, cooperative groups reach the social optimum more rapidly and there is lower efficiency loss due to reduced punishment. Our findings shed light on the importance of social learning for the acceptance of seemingly unpopular but socially desirable mechanisms.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Gürerk

2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…Research in psychology deals extensively with decision making in the presence of advice (a comprehensive review can be found in Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006) but, to the best of our knowledge, not in the context of investment tasks. Economists have recently examined whether advice facilitates social norms, cooperation, and coordination using different prominent game theoretic paradigms but never in the setting of a portfolio choice task (see, e.g., Schotter andSopher, 2003, 2007;Chaudhuri et al, 2006).…”

Section: Although In Reality It Is Difficult To Tell Who Is Informed mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Individual-specific random effects and group-specific fixed effects account for the repeated responses within fixed groups. M a n u s c r i p t advice on behavior in different games has been studied by Schotter (2003), Schotter and Sopher (2003, Chaudhuri et al (2006), and Kuang et al (2007).…”

Section: Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

On the evolution of professional consulting

Gehrig¹,

Güth²,

Levı́nský³

et al. 2010

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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International audienceIn this experiment agents repeatedly invest in three state-specific assets. Theory requires portfolios to match the probabilities of the states. The treatments endow none, one, three, or all (of eight) investors with probability information. Will professional consulting evolve as an entrepreneurial activity? Will decisions follow theory or the 1/n-heuristic of equal investments in all assets? Will agents with probability information be asked and paid for advice? Portfolios designed with probability information reect the benchmark but do not converge to it over time. Learning to avoid the 1/n-heuristic is extremely fast. Although advice is sought and readily paid for, recommendations are not always followed

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“…10 But see, e.g., Chaudhuri et al (2006) who point out that additional information about the presence of conditional cooperators may not boost contribution levels.…”

Section: Game Description and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiment

et al. 2007

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In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.JEL-classification C72, H41, D82, D83

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Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice

Cited by 57 publications

References 27 publications

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

On the evolution of professional consulting

Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiment

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