No abstract

No abstract

Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.Keywords: ultimatum bargaining, experiment, social preferences. JEL classification: C91 This version: 21 August 2013* When Güth presented the more recent ultimatum-like experiments, Uri Gneezy suggested writing a survey of more than 30 years of ultimatum bargaining research. We thank him for the nudge and David Bauder as well as Niklas Garnadt for excellent research assistance. We are extremely grateful to the magnificent members of the Economic Science Association Discussion List; many of them -too many to mention each by namepointed us to scholarly papers that use the ultimatum game. All remaining errors and omissions are of course ours. §

We develop an e v olutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of p l a y ers with dierent preferences, we i n v estigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selsh attitudes. The outcome depends on whether the individuals' interactions are strategic complements o r substitutes. Altruism a nd self-interest are context dependent.