Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Gürerk, Özgür

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.004

Cited by 20 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The experiments by Gürerk et al (2006Gürerk et al ( , 2014, Gürerk (2013), and Gürdal et al (2019) have a similar design. They let participants sort themselves individually into a standard public goods game or a game with an informal institution that allows them to punish or reward other players at some cost.…”

Section: Local Cooperation and Exclusive Institutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

Dannenberg

Gallier

2019

Exp Econ

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A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Cooperative subjects and subjects with optimistic beliefs about others often vote in favor of the institution. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always implemented by the players. Institutional costs, remaining free-riding incentives, and a lack of learning opportunities are identified as the most important barriers. Unresolved cooperation problems, like global climate change, are often characterized by these barriers. The experimental results also show that cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen institutions than exogenously imposed institutions. However, a significant share of players fails to implement the institution and they often perform poorly, which is why we cannot conclude that letting people choose is better than enforcing institutions from outside.

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Section: Local Cooperation and Exclusive Institutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

Dannenberg

Gallier

2019

Exp Econ

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“…In Gurerk (2013), before a voting phase in which they choose among alternative institutions governing the public good provision, subjects are provided with the complete history of a punishment institution which was actually implemented in a previous experiment. The author finds that social information significantly induces more subjects to accept the punishment option and reach full contributions more quickly over time.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fine Rule from a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust

Sun

Bigoni

2015

SSRN Journal

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Abstract. By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment mechanism within a one-shot binary trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. In the second we exogenously introduce a sanctioning rule that imposes on untrustworthy second-movers a penalty proportional to the number of those who reciprocate trust. This generates a second equilibrium where everybody trusts and reciprocates. In the third game, the collective punishment mechanism is adopted through majority-voting. In line with the theory, we find that the exogenous introduction of the punishment mechanism significantly increases trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. However, in the third game the majority of subjects vote against it: subjects seem to be unable to endogenously adopt an institution which, when exogenously imposed, proves to be efficiency enhancing.

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“…17 See for example Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005), Bicchieri amd Xiao (2009), Servátka (2009), Gächter, Nosenzo and Sefton (2012), or Gürerk (2012 identical to those in the Contract Choice Experiment. The only difference is that not the principal but now the agent sees a table similar to one in the Norms treatment with efforts of 10 selected employees from a previous experiment.…”

Section: A Contract Choice and Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence

Danilov

Sliwka

2017

Management Science

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. ABSTRACT Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental EvidenceWe investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information about "norms of behavior". Compared to a setting with uninformed principals agents exert nearly 50% higher efforts under a fixed wage contract when an informed principal had chosen this contract. Apparently the informed principal's choice signals a norm not to exploit the trust which leads to more trustworthy behavior. This mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments.JEL Classification: D03, C91, D86

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Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Cited by 20 publications

References 26 publications

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

A Fine Rule from a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust

Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence

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