Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

Alatas, Vivi; Cameron, Lisa; Chaudhuri, Ananish; Erkal, Nisvan; Gangadharan, Lata

doi:10.1007/s10683-008-9207-3

Cited by 110 publications

(106 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Each act of bribery contributes to those damages, and everybody including those participating in bribery, suffers from them. 7 Hence, to capture these features in our game, we reduce the total payoffs available to the two players when the official asks for a bribe, and thus impose an overall decrease in social efficiency. We further wanted to keep the game as simple as possible, hence we chose this way of implementing the harmful effects of corruption.…”

Section: The Symmetric Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Abbink

Dasgupta

Gangadharan

et al. 2014

Journal of Public Economics

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121

115

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This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribetakers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

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Section: The Symmetric Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Abbink

Dasgupta

Gangadharan

et al. 2014

Journal of Public Economics

Self Cite

121

115

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Likewise, tolerance with respect to corruption may di¤er across cultures (Cameron et al 2006) and subject pools (Alatas et al 2006b). …”

Section: The Experimental Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Corruption be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment

Armantier

Boly

2008

SSRN Journal

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This paper makes an attempt at testing the external validity of corruption experiments by moving from the lab in a developed country, to where it matters the most, the …eld in a developing country. In our experiment a candidate proposes a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a better grade. We …nd the direction and the magnitude of most treatment e¤ects to be statistically indistinguishable between the lab and the …eld. In particular, increasing the graders'wage reduces in both environments the probability to accept the bribe. Finally, we identify several micro-determinants of corruption (age, religiousness, ability). We would like to thank the recruiting …rm Opty-RH for its help with hiring subjects in Burkina Faso. Finally, the authors gratefully acknowledge …nancing from the CRSH. As always, all remaining errors are ours.

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“…Female participants are less likely to engage in corrupt activities (Rivas 2013); (also see Lambsdorff and Frank 2011). In Indonesia, public officials are less likely to accept a bribe than students (Alatas, Cameron et al 2009b). In Australia, women are less likely to offer a bribe, but not in India, Indonesia and Singapore (Alatas, Cameron et al 2009a).…”

Section: D) Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology

Engel

2016

SSRN Journal

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Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

Abstract: Corruption, Experiments, Subject pool effects, C91, D73, O12, K42,

Cited by 110 publications

References 25 publications

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Can Corruption be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment

Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology

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