Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore

Cameron, Lisa; Chaudhuri, Ananish; Erkal, Nisvan; Gangadharan, Lata

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.03.004

Cited by 211 publications

(214 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…135 rupees, although this is not statistically significant. 18 The drop stems from fewer bribe demands, not the amount that is asked for. Figure 5 describes the average bribes asked in each treatment, conditional on a positive bribe demand.…”

Section: Do Officials Demand Fewer Bribes?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Abbink

Dasgupta

Gangadharan

et al. 2014

Journal of Public Economics

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121

115

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This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribetakers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

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Section: Do Officials Demand Fewer Bribes?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Abbink

Dasgupta

Gangadharan

et al. 2014

Journal of Public Economics

Self Cite

121

115

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…They also show that negative externalities imposed by the briber on the society do not affect bribery and that tougher sanctions imposed on bribers if bribery is discovered reduce corruption at the extensive margin. Their paper has paved the way for numerous experiments that have shed light on the effects of staff rotation (Abbink, 2004), wages of public officials (Abbink, 2005;Van Veldhuizen, 2013) and culture (Barr and Serra, 2010;Cameron et al, 2009) on corruption, among others. 5 Four recent papers are linked to our study.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Cooperation

Buffat

Senn

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Corruption is a widespread phenomenon. Nevertheless, causal evidence on the effects of corruption is still lacking. In this paper, we assess whether and how corruption affects cooperation using a public good game experiment. Overall, contributions to the public good are reduced by 30% when participants have the possibility to bribe the punishment authority. Two concurrent channels lead to lower levels of cooperation. First, the punishment of low contributors decreases both at the intensive and the extensive margin. Second, bribery discourages initially high contributors, who gradually decrease their contributions down to the level of initially low contributors. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL CODES: C91, D73, K42

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“…To shed more light on the micro level factors, I have run bribery games with over 700 students, comparing individual decision-making in the U.S. and Germany. The sequential-move game builds on the work of Alatas et al (2009) and Cameron et al (2009), which confronts people with a common bribery problem. It consists of three persons in which two players can act corruptly to increase their own payoff at the expense of a third player.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Let’s Play: Bribery Games in the US and Germany

Kubbe

2017

Corruption and Norms

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This article focuses on behavioral differences across cultures in an experimental bribery game that contributes to cross-country comparisons. To answer the question "What affects an individual's propensity to engage in and punish corrupt actions?", run bribery games have been run with over 700 students, comparing individual decision-making in the U.S. and Germany. Contrary to the assumptions, almost 70% of the Californian participants offered and accepted a bribe. In Germany almost 50% took the opportunity to offer a bribe and 40% accepted one. In the U.S., 52% punished corrupt acts, compared to 80% in Germany. The results can be explained by differences in the level of individualism and by "a cultural transmission of corruption." This explanation should also imply a society's ability to build anti-corruption norms.

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Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore

Cited by 211 publications

References 32 publications

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Corruption and Cooperation

Let’s Play: Bribery Games in the US and Germany

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