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We exploit transient and permanent error control methods to address Hardware Trojan (HT) issues in Network-on Chip (NoC) links. The use of hardware-efficient error control methods on NoC links has the potential to reduce the overall hardware cost for security protection, with respect to cryptographic-based rerouting algorithms. An error control coding method for transient errors is used to detect the HT induced link errors. Regarding the faulty links as permanently failed interconnects, we propose to reshuffle the links and isolate the HT -controlled link wires. Rather than rerouting packets via alternative paths, the proposed method resumes the utilization of partially failed links to improve the bandwidth and the average latency of NoCs. Simulation results show that our method improves the average latency by up to 44.7% over the rerouting approach. The reduction on latency varies from 20% to 41 % for three traffic patterns on a 5x5 mesh NoC. The impact of different HT locations on NoC links was examined, as well. Our method is not sensitive to HT locations and can improve the effective bandwidth by up to 29 bits per cycle with minor overhead.

This article presents a systematic approach to realize highly dynamic control strategies for the air path of diesel engines. It is based on grey-box models of individual air path components, designed to be applied in nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC). Specifically, they are suited for algorithmic differentiation and gradient-based optimization. This modular approach allows to derive models for a variety of complex air path systems and can be identified with a low amount of measurement data. An NMPC structure, which is based on these models, enables the tracking of arbitrary air path reference signals and allows the introduction of further control objectives for overactuated systems. We demonstrate our approach's general applicability and effectiveness on two different laboratory engines using rapid control prototyping hardware. For a turbocharged light-duty diesel engine with dual-loop exhaust gas recirculation (EGR), we apply the proposed control structure to track intake manifold gas conditions while simultaneously minimizing engine pumping losses. Experimental results show an excellent tracking performance and reduced pumping losses compared to other control strategies. For a turbocharged heavy-duty engine with high-pressure EGR, we experimentally demonstrate a superior tracking performance to that obtained with a reference controller. Due to the modular and systematic approach, the algorithm design is straightforward, and the experimental calibration effort is low.

Driven by malicious intent, attackers are impelled to extract the cipher key and thus compromise the cryptosystem through fault attacks. Existing fault-detection methods can effectively detect random faults in the cipher implementation, but yield a high fault bypass rate (FBR) under intelligent fault attacks. To address this limitation, we propose a new microarchitecture to thwart fault attacks that place mathematically symmetric faults on the two encryption data paths. To further reduce the FBR for a new lightweight cipher SIMON, we propose a new countermeasure that integrates operand permutation and masking techniques. Closed-form expressions for de-permutation and de-masking in SIMON are provided in this letter. Our method was assessed under two fault attack scenarios (random and symmetric fault injections) with bit-flip, stuck-at-0, and stuck-at-1 fault models. Simulation results show that our method minimizes the FBR to zero with the fault attack scenarios of symmetric fault location and stuck-at-0 fault injections. Overall, the proposed method outperforms the existing fault-detection methods in multiple fault attack conditions, at the cost of 5% more area overhead than the most hardware-efficient fault detection method. Index Terms-Block cipher, cryptography, fault attacks, fault bypass rate, fault detection, security, SIMON.