A hardened network-on-chip design using runtime hardware Trojan mitigation methods

Frey, Jonathan; Yu, Qiaoyan

doi:10.1016/j.vlsi.2016.06.008

Cited by 40 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…3D NoC eliminates the need for long global interconnects and reduces the voltage droop and power consumption on long wires. A rogue 2D NoC leads to information leaking and bandwidth depletion [36]. If NoC-based 3D ICs have a synergic Trojan placed in some IP cores or 3D switches, that Trojan leads to a similar consequence, as shown in Fig.…”

Section: Example Analysismentioning

confidence: 95%

Comprehensive Analysis on Hardware Trojans in 3D ICs: Characterization and Experimental Impact Assessment

et al. 2020

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Three-dimensional (3D) integration facilitates to integrate an increasing number of transistors into a single package. Despite improved performance and power efficiency, the integration of multiple dies in the same package potentially leads to new security threats, such as 3D hardware Trojans. This work conducts a thorough survey on hardware Trojans reported in 3D integrated circuits (ICs) and systems, and proposes a comprehensive characterization of 3D hardware Trojans. Several case studies are performed to validate the feasibility of 3D hardware Trojan implementation. Our experimental results indicate that 3D ICs indeed provide a better environment for inserting stealthy thermal-based Trojans than 2D ICs. Multiple FPGA boards are utilized to conceptually emulate the stacked 3D ICs that experience multi-tier hardware Trojans. The stealthiness and effectiveness of the proposed multi-tier Trojans are validated in our case studies. The emulation results further show that the existing current-based self-referencing Trojan detection method designed for 2D Trojans will result in a lower detection rate in 3D scenarios. Keywords Three-dimensional integration • Hardware Trojan • Trojan model • Side-channel analysis attack • Interconnect • Power distribution network (PDN) • Network-on-chip (NoC) This article is part of the topical collection "Hardware-Assisted Security Solutions for Electronic Systems" guest edited by

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Section: Example Analysismentioning

confidence: 95%

Comprehensive Analysis on Hardware Trojans in 3D ICs: Characterization and Experimental Impact Assessment

et al. 2020

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“…DoS attacks on a many-core chip can target different components of the chip, including the memory system [15], and the network-on-chip (NoC) [16], [17]. With the help of hardware Trojans (HTs) [3], [4], [13], DoS attacks can be classified as 1) flooding attack [18], [19], where a large volume of useless packets floods a victim node and saturates it; 2) packet drop attack, where some packets are dropped or directed to some malicious nodes so that the victim node can never receive a single packet designated to it [20]; 3) privilege escalation attack [21], where an average user process is granted the privileges of a supervisor so that it can steal passwords; and 4) routing loop attack [2], where packets that pass the malicious node will be routed back to the source node, effectively blocking the source core from communicating with any other cores.…”

Section: B Dos Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

On a New Hardware Trojan Attack on Power Budgeting of Many Core Systems

Zhao

Wang

Jiang

et al. 2018

2018 31st IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)

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In this paper, we study stealthy false-data attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities of power budgeting scheme in NoC, which can cause catastrophic denial of service (DoS) effects. Essentially, when a power budget request packet is routed through a Trojan-infected network-on-chip node's router, the power budget request can be unknowingly modified. The global manager then tends to make really bad power budget allocation decisions with all the tampered power requests it received. That is, legitimate applications will be victimized with lower power budgets than what they initially asked for, and thus, could suffer serious performance degradation; malicious applications, on the other hand, may be entitled to high power budgets and thus see performance boost that they do not deserve. Our study has shown that this new type of DoS attack can be initiated and sustained by a simple hardware Trojan (HT) circuit that is extremely hard to be detected. The effects of this new DoS attack are simulated using a network model, and all the major parameters and factors that impact the attack effects are identified and quantified.

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“…Hereafter, we refer to this method as address filtering at the router. The work [40] proposed a novel router design to detect and mitigate HTs at the NoC router level (detection and mitigation at the router). The zoom-in view of Figure 11 depicts the high-level view of the HT countermeasures (HTC) applied in the south input port and the east output port.…”

Section: Localizing Hardware Trojan Detection and Mitigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…High-level view of the runtime router hardening method against Trojan injection in NoCs[40]. HTC, HT countermeasure.…”

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confidence: 99%

Towards Energy-Efficient and Secure Computing Systems

Zhang

2018

JLPEA

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Countermeasures against diverse security threats typically incur noticeable hardware cost and power overhead, which may become the obstacle for those countermeasures to be applicable in energy-efficient computing systems. This work presents a summary of energy-efficiency techniques that have been applied in security primitives or mechanisms to ensure computing systems’ resilience against various security threats on hardware. This work also uses examples to discuss practical methods for securing the hardware for computing systems to achieve energy efficiency.

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A hardened network-on-chip design using runtime hardware Trojan mitigation methods

Cited by 40 publications

References 19 publications

Comprehensive Analysis on Hardware Trojans in 3D ICs: Characterization and Experimental Impact Assessment

Comprehensive Analysis on Hardware Trojans in 3D ICs: Characterization and Experimental Impact Assessment

On a New Hardware Trojan Attack on Power Budgeting of Many Core Systems

Towards Energy-Efficient and Secure Computing Systems

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