Exploiting state obfuscation to detect hardware trojans in NoC network interfaces

Frey, Jonathan; Yu, Qiaoyan

doi:10.1109/mwscas.2015.7282167

Cited by 22 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Round-robin arbitration is used in both 2D NoC and NOC-SIP. The NI for the 2D mesh NoC is OCP-IP compatible [24]. The hardware cost of our NOC-SIP is compared with two typical 4×4 mesh NoCs.…”

Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hardware Security Threats and Potential Countermeasures in Emerging 3D ICs

Dofe

Wang

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 26th Edition on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI

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New hardware security threats are identified in emerging threedimensional (3D) integrated circuits (ICs) and potential countermeasures are introduced. Trigger and payload mechanisms for future 3D hardware Trojans are predicted. Furthermore, a novel, network-on-chip based 3D obfuscation method is proposed to block the direct communication between two commercial dies in a 3D structure, thus thwarting reverse engineering attacks on the vertical dimension. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method effectively obfuscates the cross-plane communication by increasing the reverse engineering time by approximately 5× as compared to using direct through silicon via (TSV) connections. The proposed method consumes approximately one fifth the area and power of a typical network-on-chip designed in a 65 nm technology, exhibiting limited overhead.

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Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The conclusion obtained from this analysis is valid for the entire network. As listed in Table 1, the proposed NOC-SIP with source routing (XY routing) consumes 82% (86%) less area than the 2D NoC in [24]. We added the typical 2D router design and the NI presented in [25] as another reference point.…”

Section: Area Delay and Power Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware Security Threats and Potential Countermeasures in Emerging 3D ICs

Dofe

Wang

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 26th Edition on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI

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“…• Bus-level Trojansthis type of HT is connected with the network fabrics of buses (i.e., linkers [26], [27]) or embedded into the modules of the on-chip buses (such as routing nodes [19], [108], control units, and network interfaces [28]). They are mainly triggered by internal rare signals or by data flowing through the on-chip buses and can tamper with the integrity and reliability of interconnection fabrics and routers in the SoC designs (as shown in Fig.…”

Section: A Ht Definition Taxonomy and Protection 1) Ht Definition mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Machine Learning Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Recent Advances and Challenges

et al. 2020

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The remarkable success of machine learning (ML) in a variety of research domains has inspired academic and industrial communities to explore its potential to address hardware Trojan (HT) attacks. While numerous works have been published over the past decade, few survey papers, to the best of our knowledge, have systematically reviewed the achievements and analyzed the remaining challenges in this area. To fill this gap, this article surveys ML-based approaches against HT attacks available in the literature. In particular, we first provide a classification of all possible HT attacks and then review recent developments from four perspectives, i.e., HT detection, design-for-security (DFS), bus security, and secure architecture. Based on the review, we further discuss the lessons learned in and challenges arising from previous studies. Despite current work focusing more on chip-layer HT problems, it is notable that novel HT threats are constantly emerging and have evolved beyond chips and to the component, device, and even behavior layers, therein compromising the security and trustworthiness of the overall hardware ecosystem. Therefore, we divide the HT threats into four layers and propose a hardware Trojan defense (HTD) reference model from the perspective of the overall hardware ecosystem, therein categorizing the security threats and requirements in each layer to provide a guideline for future research in this direction.

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“…Another study provided a proof-of-concept demonstration of the potential benefit of using logical implications for the detection of combinational hardware Trojans [20]. In [21], the authors concerned on the hardware Trojan detection in the network interfaces of networks-on-chip using the state obfuscation.…”

Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectiveness of HT-assisted sinkhole and blackhole denial of service attacks targeting mesh networks-on-chip

Zhang

Wang

Jiang

et al. 2018

Journal of Systems Architecture

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There are ample opportunities at both design and manufacturing phases to meddle in a many-core chip system, especially its underlining communication fabric, known as the networks-on-chip (NoC), through the inclusion of malicious hardware Trojans (HT). In this paper, we focus on studying two specific HT-assisted Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely the sinkhole and blackhole attacks, that directly target the NoC of a many-core chip. As of the blackhole attacks, those intermediate routers with inserted HTs can stop forwarding data packets/flits towards the packets' destination; instead, packets are either dropped from the network or diverted to some other malicious nodes. Sinkhole attacks, which exhibit similar attack effects as blackhole attacks, can occur when the NoC supports adaptive routing. In this case, a malicious node actively solicits packets from its neighbor nodes by pretending to have sufficient free buffer slots. Effects and efficiencies of both sinkhole and blackhole DoS attacks are modeled and quantified in this paper, and a few factors that influence attack effects are found to be critical. Through fine-tuning of these parameters, both attacks are shown to cause more damages to the NoC, measured as over 30% increase in packet loss rate. Even with current detection and defense methods in place, the packet loss rate is still remarkably high, suggesting the need of new and more effective detection and defense methods against the enhanced blackhole and sinkhole attacks as described in the paper.

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Exploiting state obfuscation to detect hardware trojans in NoC network interfaces

Cited by 22 publications

References 14 publications

Hardware Security Threats and Potential Countermeasures in Emerging 3D ICs

Hardware Security Threats and Potential Countermeasures in Emerging 3D ICs

A Survey on Machine Learning Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Recent Advances and Challenges

Effectiveness of HT-assisted sinkhole and blackhole denial of service attacks targeting mesh networks-on-chip

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