52% Yes, a signiicant crisis 3% No, there is no crisis 7% Don't know 38% Yes, a slight crisis 38% Yes, a slight crisis 1,576 RESEARCHERS SURVEYED M ore than 70% of researchers have tried and failed to reproduce another scientist's experiments, and more than half have failed to reproduce their own experiments. Those are some of the telling figures that emerged from Nature's survey of 1,576 researchers who took a brief online questionnaire on reproducibility in research. The data reveal sometimes-contradictory attitudes towards reproduc-ibility. Although 52% of those surveyed agree that there is a significant 'crisis' of reproducibility, less than 31% think that failure to reproduce published results means that the result is probably wrong, and most say that they still trust the published literature. Data on how much of the scientific literature is reproducible are rare and generally bleak. The best-known analyses, from psychology 1 and cancer biology 2 , found rates of around 40% and 10%, respectively. Our survey respondents were more optimistic: 73% said that they think that at least half of the papers in their field can be trusted, with physicists and chemists generally showing the most confidence. The results capture a confusing snapshot of attitudes around these issues, says Arturo Casadevall, a microbiologist at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. "At the current time there is no consensus on what reproducibility is or should be. " But just recognizing that is a step forward, he says. "The next step may be identifying what is the problem and to get a consensus. "

Trust is essential for a secure and flourishing social life, but many economic and philosophical approaches argue that rational people should never extend it, in particular to strangers they will never encounter again. Emerging data on the trust game, a laboratory economic exchange, suggests that people trust strangers excessively (i.e., far more than their tolerance for risk and cynical views of their peers should allow). What produces this puzzling "excess" of trust? We argue that people trust due to a norm mandating that they show respect for the other person's character, presuming the other person has sufficient integrity and goodwill even if they do not believe it privately. Six studies provided converging evidence that decisions to trust follow the logic of norms. Trusting others is what people think they should do, and the emotions associated with fulfilling a social duty or responsibility (e.g., guilt, anxiety) account for at least a significant proportion of the excessive trust observed. Regarding the specific norm in play, trust rates collapse when respect for the other person's character is eliminated as an issue.

Behavioral norms influence human interaction in virtually every situation, yet the study of norms in the behavioral sciences lags relative to their real‐world power and significance. We describe basic distinctions in norms emerging in the behavioral and social sciences – in particular, how norms may be descriptive (i.e,, what people commonly do) versus injunctive (i.e,, what people should do), and social (i.e,, beliefs about what other people think one should do) versus moral (i.e,, what one privately thinks one should do). We further describe empirical methods that researchers can use to examine whether any particular behavior is inspired by norms and which variant might be responsible. We end by describing emerging findings and questions in recent work on norms. Thus, the purpose of this review is to attempt to organize scholarship about norms for social and personality psychology, in the hope that it may foster empirical investigation of norm‐driven behavior and thus build connections to other behavioral sciences.

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Past research has demonstrated that people's need to perceive the world as fair and just leads them to blame and derogate victims of tragedy. The research reported here shows that a positive reaction--bestowing additional meaning on the lives of individuals who have suffered--can also serve people's need to believe that the world is just. In two studies, participants whose justice motive was temporarily heightened or who strongly endorsed the belief that reward and punishment are fairly distributed in the world perceived more meaning and enjoyment in the life of someone who had experienced a tragedy than in the life of someone who had not experienced tragedy, but this pattern was not found for participants whose justice motive was not heightened or who did not strongly endorse a justice belief. These results suggest that being motivated to see the world as just--a motivation traditionally associated with victim derogation--also leads people to perceive a "silver lining" to tragic events.

see also Chapter 10, this volume). For example, system justification theory describes how, when people feel the current status quo cannot be changed, or would rather it did not, they will find ways to justify its unjust aspects. This generally entails believing the advantaged of society deserve what they have, and the underprivileged deserve their disadvantaged status and the bad things that happen to them (Jost & Banaji, 1994;Kay, Banfield, & Laurin, 2010). Doing so allows the individual to maintain beliefs in the fairness and justice of the system.In this chapter, we review research investigating another method of dealing with evidence that bad things happen to decent people-evidence that contradicts one's fundamental beliefs. Specifically, we describe research demonstrating compensatory strategies that allow one to perceive negative outcomes as "balanced out" by other benefits to the victim. These strategies allow the perceiver to maintain his or her beliefs.We begin with a review of the content of beliefs in the world as meaningful and just, and research on the psychological consequences of negative experiences for meaning making, then turn to research on the use of compensatory strategies specifically. JuSTICE BELIEFSJanoff-Bulman (1992) provided evidence that people possess three core beliefs or fundamental assumptions about reality. First, people tend to assume the world is a good place: They rate the benevolence of people and events quite positively (Janoff-Bulman, 1989). Second, they believe in the meaningfulness of the world. This is essentially a justice belief: People expect individuals' outcomes to be distributed according to what kind of people they are. In other words, people believe in a just world, one in which "people get what they deserve and deserve what they get" (Lerner, 1980). Finally, the third core belief is in one's own self-worth, as a good, capable, and moral person. This last point is perhaps the most contentious, given the universality of the need to maintain a positive self-view (see Boucher, 2010, for a review). At least in the Western world, however, self-esteem is typically high, and people assume they are better than average on numerous dimensions (e.g., Lerner,

Expecting responsiveness from a partner may increase the chance of successful conflict resolution through a self‐fulfilling prophecy. Such expectations derive in part from people's history of receiving responsiveness and from their belief that their partner values them (S. L. Murray, J. G. Holmes, & N. L. Collins, 2006). This belief can be fostered by having individuals reframe a partner's compliment in an abstract way (D. C. Marigold, J. G. Holmes, & M. Ross, 2007). In this study, 96 dating couples were randomly assigned to complete a compliment reframing intervention (or not) prior to discussing a conflict. Without intervention, couples who typically had a lot of conflict reported less positive expectations of their partner for the upcoming discussion and subsequently worse outcomes than low‐conflict couples; these differences were eliminated in the compliment reframing condition. This research demonstrates the importance of perceived value and expectations of responsiveness in shaping the outcomes of conflict discussions, suggesting additional points of intervention beyond communication skills for high‐conflict couples.

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