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Significant ambiguity remains in the literature regarding the conceptualization of organizational ambidexterity. We unpack this construct into one with two dimensions we term the balance dimension of ambidexterity (BD) and the combined dimension of ambidexterity (CD). BD corresponds to a firm's orientation to maintain a close relative balance between exploratory and exploitative activities, whereas CD corresponds to their combined magnitude. We reason that these dimensions are conceptually distinct, and rely on different causal mechanisms to enhance firm performance. We find that over and above their independent effects, concurrent high levels of BD and CD yield synergistic benefits. We also find that BD is more beneficial to resource-constrained firms, whereas CD is more beneficial to firms having greater access to internal and/or external resources. These results indicate that managers in resource-constrained contexts may benefit from a focus on managing trade-offs between exploration and exploitation demands, but for firms that have access to sufficient resources, the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation is both possible and desirable.

We argue that the challenges faced by threshold firms are deeply rooted in governance characteristics (i.e. the incentives, authority and legitimacy) which imbue them with characteristic capabilities, disabilities and path dependencies. Whereas Zahra and Filatotchev (2004) reason the principal problem facing threshold firms relates to organizational learning and knowledge management, we posit resource acquisition and utilization to be equally important. Moreover, we argue governance theory is more able than a knowledge-based perspective to explain the "root causes" of the learning and resource issues faced by threshold firms as well as the complex set of processes involved in their effective management. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.

This introduction to the special issue considers past and current research on "Social Capital and Entrepreneurship" to develop a schema and an associated research agenda. With the general goal of establishing social capital as a foundational theory of entrepreneurship, we discuss how future research can utilize social capital perspectives across levels of analysis and contexts to explain a wide variety of entrepreneurship phenomena.

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c T-The ownership strategies of 128 retail franchising systems are examined in the light of existing agency and resource scarcity explanations of this organizational form. Findings suggest that franchiser ownership strategies are more heterogeneous than previously recognized, and that neither explanation, alone accounts for observed ownership patterns. A path model of franchiser ownership patterns embodying agency and resource scarcity elements is developed that is consistent with empirical findings.

The universe of family firms is heterogeneous, and findings gleaned from publicly listed firms may not apply to the ubiquitous, but less frequently studied, privately held family firm (PFF). As PFFs are insulated from capital market pressures, owner-managers have greater latitude in setting strategic goals, which may result in different strategic choices and performance outcomes. By employing meta-analytical techniques on 48 studies conducted in nine countries, we synthesize prior PFF research. We show that PFFs prefer more conservative strategies, but contrary to received wisdom, this risk aversion does not hurt their performance. We conclude with an agenda for future research.

Despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent, this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross‐national sample. This study empirically examines the ownership concentration–performance relationship across the nations of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Essentially, we argue that the correlation (if any) between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance. Results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.