It is generally accepted that a family's Involvement In the business makes the family business unique; but the literature continues to have difficulty defining the family business. We argue for a distinction between theoretical and operational definitions. A theoretical definition must identify the esence that distinguishes the family business from other businesses. It is the standard against which operational definitions must be measured. We propose a theoretical definition based on behavior as the essence of a family business. Our conceptual analysis shows that most of the operational definitions based on the components of family involvement overlap with our theoretical definition. Our empirical results suggest, however, that the components of family involvement typically used in operational definitions are weak predictors of Intentions and, therefore, are not always reliable for distinguishing family businesses from non-family ones.

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Using behavioral and stakeholder theories, we suggest that family firms may have family–centered non–economic goals and that these goals could influence firm behaviors. This study extends the literature by hypothesizing that the essence of family influence partially mediates the relationship between family involvement and family firms’ adoption of family–centered non–economic goals. The results using 1,060 small firms support the hypotheses. Aside from contributing to family business theory by explaining and testing mediating variables as sources of goal heterogeneity among family firms, our findings also imply that the involvement and essence approaches to defining family businesses may be hierarchically reconciled.

555This article provides a review of important trends in the strategic management approach to studying family firms: convergence in definitions, accumulating evidence that family involvement may affect performance, and the emergence of agency theory and the resourcebased view of the firm as the leading theoretical perspectives. We conclude by discussing directions for future research and other promising approaches to inform the inquiry concerning family business.

Family involvement in a business has the potential to both increase and decrease financial performance due to agency costs. In this article we discuss the different nature of agency costs in family firms and specify the combination of conditions necessary to determine the relative levels of agency costs in family and non-family firms through the impacts of agency cost control mechanisms on performance. We also present exploratory results based on a study of 1,141 small privately held U.S. family and non-family firms that suggest the overall agency problem in family firms could be less serious than that in non-family firms.

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F amily firms are thought to pursue nonfinancial goals that provide socioemotional wealth, but socioemotional wealth is feasible only with family control of the firm. Using prospect theory, we hypothesize that socioemotional wealth increases with the extent of current control, duration of control, and intentions for transgenerational control, thus adding to the price at which owners would be willing to sell their firms to nonfamily buyers. Findings from two countries show that current control has no impact, and duration of control has a mixed impact. However, intention for transgenerational control has a consistently positive impact on the perceived acceptable selling price.

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