Management and ownership effects: evidence from five countries

Abstract

Despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent, this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross‐national sample. This study empirically examines the ownership concentration–performance relationship across the nations of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Essentially, we argue that the correlation (if any) between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance. Results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The home country in the age of globalization: how much does it matter for firm performance?

“…For instance, there are high levels of ownership concentration in Europe and Far East but not in the UK and US, close relations between banks and firms exist in some countries and not others (Franks and Mayer, 1994). Corporate governance systems may motivate different types of managerial behavior and hence agency costs (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998).…”

Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

“…For firms with only one owner holding 100% of voting stock, H was set at 9,999. In alternative regression runs we used the bounded Herfindahl-Index as well as the share of the largest shareholder plus its squared value as in Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998). Further, we replaced ROA by ROE.…”

Examining the Relationship between Disproportional Ownership Mechanisms and Company Performance: An Empirical Research

“…Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Gilson, 1997) and is used as control variable since literature suggests that firm size matters for company outcomes (Banz, 1981;Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998) and negatively affects Tobin"s Q (Lang & Stulz, 1994).…”

“…This is especially true for larger companies. Indeed, in line with previous research (Banz, 1981;Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998;Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010), findings in Table 5 document that the variable SIZE is significantly and positively related to the use of DOMs (,372 *** ). Thereby, the result emphasizes that, in larger Italian companies, disproportional ownership mechanisms play a relevant economic function Institutional Shareholder Services, 2007;Attig et al, 2008) as tools able to limit transaction costs and foster risks sharing (Watanabe, 2002;Gianfrate, 2007;Mishra, 2011).…”