The Adolescence of Family Firm Research: Taking Stock and Planning for the Future

Family entrepreneurship as a field of research: Exploring its contours and contents

“…The adoption of different theoretical perspectives may lead to different assumptions and misleading interpretations of the results, which is one of the main reasons why we are rarely able to find a clear consensus in the literature on family business (Gedajlovic, et al, 2012). We advocate here for the adoption of multiple theoretical approaches that should complement each other in such a way that allows us to dispose of a broader theoretical base and have a clearer, more pluralistic view of family entrepreneurship.…”

“…According to the stewardship theory family owners seek to fulfill both economic and non-economic needs such as those of affiliation, self-actualization, generosity, and legacy; this leads family owners to act as stewards in order to favor sustainable value for all shareholders (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997;Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). According to this theory, the enlightened self-interest of a founder and his/her committed family produce contagious and self-reinforcing behaviors that are transmitted to the wider community (Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012). and decreased agency problems, depending on the stage of the business (Karra, et al, 2006).…”

“…leading to contradictory conclusions (Gedajlovic, et al, 2012). This is why according to management luminaries, the main challenge is to find a paradigm or theoretical model that serves to tie fragmented findings (Gomez Mejia, cited by Craig and Salvato, 2012).…”

Effects of Family Ownership, Debt and Board Composition on Mexican Firms Performance

“…There is a growing interest in the literature related to the analysis of how firms with ownership concentration, particularly in family groups, face these challenges, and the effects that particular ownership structures have on firm performance [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. The importance of family firms in national economies is even more evident in emerging economies, where it has been measured in terms of contribution to gross domestic product, employment, and number of firms [12,13].…”

Governance Structure and Related Party Loan Guarantees: The Case of Chinese Family Business Groups

“…Without necessarily dwelling on why or how, agency theory generally assumes that family involvement at least potentially increases P-P agency problems because family managers or directors owe more loyalty to, and have more interest in, the family (and the group of firms under family ownership generally) than the specific firm under their leadership (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005;Lubatkin et al, 2007). Thus, family managers or directors may act in the family's (private) interest rather than in the interest of the firm (Gedajlovic et al, 2012(Gedajlovic et al, : 1014. Similar to transaction cost economics and social network theory, agency theory holds family ties to create loyalty, trust, and information exchange, reducing costs of contract enforcement (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and principal-agent (P-A) agency problems (Chung & Chan, 2012), but adding to potential conflicts with minority owners who may be marginalized in terms of influence and access to information.…”