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Although neuroscience has made remarkable progress in understanding the involvement of prefrontal cortex in human memory, the necessity of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) for key competencies of working memory remains largely unexplored. We therefore studied human brain lesion patients to determine whether dlPFC is necessary for working memory function, administering subtests of the Wechsler Memory Scale, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, and the N-Back Task to three participant groups: dlPFC lesions (n = 19), non-dlPFC lesions (n = 152), and no brain lesions (n = 54). DlPFC damage was associated with deficits in the manipulation of verbal and spatial knowledge, with left dlPFC necessary for manipulating information in working memory and right dlPFC critical for manipulating information in a broader range of reasoning contexts. Our findings elucidate the architecture of working memory, providing key neuropsychological evidence for the necessity of dlPFC in the manipulation of verbal and spatial knowledge.

Causal composition allows people to generate new causal relations by combining existing causal knowledge. We introduce a new computational model of such reasoning, the force theory, which holds that people compose causal relations by simulating the processes that join forces in the world, and compare this theory with the mental model theory (Khemlani et al., 2014) and the causal model theory (Sloman et al., 2009), which explain causal composition on the basis of mental models and structural equations, respectively. In one experiment, the force theory was uniquely able to account for people's ability to compose causal relationships from complex animations of real-world events. In three additional experiments, the force theory did as well as or better than the other two theories in explaining the causal compositions people generated from linguistically presented causal relations. Implications for causal learning and the hierarchical structure of causal knowledge are discussed.

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The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals.

In recent years, theoretical perspectives on posterior parietal function have evolved beyond the traditional visuospatial processing models to include more diverse cognitive operations, such as long-term and working memory. However, definitive neuropsychological evidence supporting the superior parietal lobule's purported role in working memory has been lacking. Here, we studied human brain lesion patients to determine whether the superior parietal lobule is indeed necessary for working memory. We assessed a wide range of memory functions in three participant groups: superior parietal lesions (n ϭ 19), lesions not involving superior parietal cortex (n ϭ 146), and no brain lesions (n ϭ 55). Superior parietal damage was reliably associated with deficits on tests involving the manipulation and rearrangement of information in working memory, but not on working memory tests requiring only rehearsal and retrieval processes, nor on tests of long-term memory. These results indicate that superior parietal cortex is critically important for the manipulation of information in working memory.

Although cognitive neuroscience has made remarkable progress in understanding the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in executive control, the broader functional networks that support high-level cognition and give rise to general intelligence remain to be well characterized. Here, we investigated the neural substrates of the general factor of intelligence (g) and executive function in 182 patients with focal brain damage using voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System were used to derive measures of g and executive function, respectively. Impaired performance on these measures was associated with damage to a distributed network of left lateralized brain areas, including regions of frontal and parietal cortex and white matter association tracts, which bind these areas into a coordinated system. The observed findings support an integrative framework for understanding the architecture of general intelligence and executive function, supporting their reliance upon a shared fronto-parietal network for the integration and control of cognitive representations and making specific recommendations for the application of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System to the study of high-level cognition in health and disease.

An enduring aim of research in the psychological and brain sciences is to understand the nature of individual differences in human intelligence, examining the stunning breadth and diversity of intellectual abilities and the remarkable neurobiological mechanisms from which they arise. This Opinion article surveys recent neuroscience evidence to elucidate how general intelligence, g, emerges from individual differences in the network architecture of the human brain. The reviewed findings motivate new insights about how network topology and dynamics account for individual differences in g, represented by the Network Neuroscience Theory. According to this framework, g emerges from the small-world topology of brain networks and the dynamic reorganization of its community structure in the service of system-wide flexibility and adaptation.