2003
DOI: 10.1016/s1364-6613(02)00029-3
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Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems

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Cited by 967 publications
(723 citation statements)
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References 35 publications
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“…Thus, on the basis of past research findings and interpretations, we assume that evidence indicating that actions are integrated also indicates that the perceptual features associated with these actions are integrated, and together form a representation of an action event. This assumption is consistent with instance theories (Logan 1988), modal theories of memory (e.g., Barsalou 2009;Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson 2003), and the theory of event coding (Hommel et al, 2001). It is unlikely that the strong associations between perceptual features and action features are broken such that only the perceptual features or only the action features are represented in an event.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 69%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Thus, on the basis of past research findings and interpretations, we assume that evidence indicating that actions are integrated also indicates that the perceptual features associated with these actions are integrated, and together form a representation of an action event. This assumption is consistent with instance theories (Logan 1988), modal theories of memory (e.g., Barsalou 2009;Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson 2003), and the theory of event coding (Hommel et al, 2001). It is unlikely that the strong associations between perceptual features and action features are broken such that only the perceptual features or only the action features are represented in an event.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 69%
“…It is argued that motor activation is induced by action words, affordances of perceptual objects, and other perceptual events because motor activation is intrinsically linked to the processing of semantics and affordances (e.g., Fagioli, Ferlazzo, & Hommel, 2007;Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007;von Cramon 2002, 2003;Tipper et al, 2006;Tucker and Ellis 1998). In other words, motor activation is part of the meaning or concept, regardless of whether the meaning or concept is represented by a word(s), object(s), or actions of another individual (e.g., Pulvermüller 2005;Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, Van Elk, & Bekkering, 2009), which is consistent with modal theories of memory (e.g., Barsalou 2009;Barsalou et al, 2003). Our results are consistent with these findings and interpretations.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 53%
“…According to a situated conceptualization view, people represent knowledge as partial simulations of sensory, motor, and introspective states (Barsalou, 1999;Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003;Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003). As an event is experienced, the underlying sensory, motor, and introspective states are partially stored.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The majority of language studies have been firmly focused on language proper, to the exclusion of context and multimodal expression that contribute to utterance and meaning construction. A major consequence of the second assumption is our conception of language processing and language development as an abstract and symbolic system, where linking between linguistic and conceptual levels is a process of transduction from linguistic symbols to cognitive representations only arbitrarily linked [1]. Below, we discuss the consequences of these two assumptions, which we see as arising from an excessively narrow lens on language as the object of study, in more detail ( §1a,b).…”
Section: Language Studies: the Current Focus Approaches And Assumptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%