Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

Abstract

In this article we examine when and why secondary and tertiary states select a strategy that does not entail following the lead of the rising states. To address these questions we outline a simple model that examines systemic and sub-systemic (regional) constraints on and opportunities for secondary and tertiary states: how engaged in the region is the global hegemon, how many rising (and extra-regional) states are in the region, and which states are waxing and waning and by how much. These three characteristics create different opportunities for and constraints on secondary and tertiary states, which in turn influence the set of strategy choices of these states as they respond to the regional hegemon. Our model cannot account for the specific foreign policy strategies that secondary and tertiary states select. Such a model would require domestic and individual level variables. We leave it to the area specialists and experts in the following articles in the volume to introduce these variables and explain the specific strategies used. Instead, based on our model we can explain general tendencies toward accommodative strategies, resistance strategies and neutral strategies. It is important to note that secondary and tertiary states can use a mix of different strategies toward regional and global hegemons, such as resisting primary threats and accommodating secondary threats. Moreover, secondary and tertiary states are often engaged in multiple games -a strategy might appear to be costly and suboptimal at one level but reasonable and optimal at another level. Finally, in selecting a strategy secondary and tertiary states factor the systemic, subsystemic and domestic costs of the alternative strategies.

Revisiting consensual hegemony: Brazilian regional leadership in question

“…Reliance on the power of ideas introduces a significant element of fragility to consensual hegemony because it can either be challenged by a competing vision or outright supplanted by application of alternative economic or security incentives. South America of the 1990s was fertile ground for consensual hegemony because of the sort of lack of engagement by the global hegemon that Lobell et al (2015) identity as being important for creating a permissive environment for alternate approaches to order. During the Lula years the continent was largely ignored by the United States and other international powers in practical terms even if there did appear to be clear engagement through hemispheric multilateralism and military cooperation.…”

“…Failure to adequately satisfy these demands incites quiet resistance and soft forms of defection (Lobell et al, 2015). In the Brazilian case this meant push-back on Brasília's low-cost consensual hegemony strategy (Flemes and Wehner, 2015).…”

It’s not the size, it’s the relationship: from ‘small states’ to asymmetry

“…This would later be echoed by four-part divisions used by scholars of middle or rising powers (Mares, 1988). "Scholars create their own definitions and disagree on whether absolute or relative power is the key, the nature of influence on neighbors and/or the system, and many others factors," Lobell et al (2015) recently noted. (Kamrava, 2013), and 'positional power' according to others (Rubin and Jordan, 2015).…”

The hegemonichermano: South American collective identity and Brazilian regional strategy

“…The emergence of regional leaders is only possible as long as a greater power is not directly involved in the area (Lobell, Jesse, and Williams 2015). Hence, Brazil's leadership was an important cause of Mercosur's institutionalization and of FTAA's obstruction, but an equally significant element was the absence of competing US leadership due to their lack of interest in the region (Teixeira 2011, 194).…”