Revisiting consensual hegemony: Brazilian regional leadership in question

Burges, Sean W.

doi:10.1057/ip.2014.43

Cited by 43 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…For the rising state, this might entail providing for regional public goods, creating friendly regional organizations or bullying local states. For instance, according to Burges (2015), American disengagement in South America allowed the Lula administration to act as a consensual hegemon, though given Brazil's limited resources, it failed to become a cooperative hegemon, providing more of the public goods.…”

Section: How Engaged Is the Global Hegemon?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

Lobell¹,

Jesse

Williams

2015

Int Polit

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In this article we examine when and why secondary and tertiary states select a strategy that does not entail following the lead of the rising states. To address these questions we outline a simple model that examines systemic and sub-systemic (regional) constraints on and opportunities for secondary and tertiary states: how engaged in the region is the global hegemon, how many rising (and extra-regional) states are in the region, and which states are waxing and waning and by how much. These three characteristics create different opportunities for and constraints on secondary and tertiary states, which in turn influence the set of strategy choices of these states as they respond to the regional hegemon. Our model cannot account for the specific foreign policy strategies that secondary and tertiary states select. Such a model would require domestic and individual level variables. We leave it to the area specialists and experts in the following articles in the volume to introduce these variables and explain the specific strategies used. Instead, based on our model we can explain general tendencies toward accommodative strategies, resistance strategies and neutral strategies. It is important to note that secondary and tertiary states can use a mix of different strategies toward regional and global hegemons, such as resisting primary threats and accommodating secondary threats. Moreover, secondary and tertiary states are often engaged in multiple games -a strategy might appear to be costly and suboptimal at one level but reasonable and optimal at another level. Finally, in selecting a strategy secondary and tertiary states factor the systemic, subsystemic and domestic costs of the alternative strategies.

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Section: How Engaged Is the Global Hegemon?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

Lobell¹,

Jesse

Williams

2015

Int Polit

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“…Others have focused on short-term tactics -rather than long-term structural constraints -softening the realist lexicon and switching the emphasis to the analysis of Brazil's "leadership" instead of its primacy (Malamud 2011;Burges 2015). The next section explains why most countries in the region have not implemented any consistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis-à-vis Brazil.…”

Section: Figure 2: Cinc Country Share and Expected Behaviors In Southmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…9 Similarly, many studies have confused bandwagoning with tactic convergence. However, a certain country's support for foreign policy initiatives, joint membership in regional institutions (Burges 2015), or friendly declarations (GomezMera 2013) do not guarantee that it does not see Brazil as a threat.…”

Section: Figure 2: Cinc Country Share and Expected Behaviors In Southmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Brazilian Rise and the Elusive South American Balance

Schenoni

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Why have most countries in the region not implemented any consistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis-à-vis Brazil? Drawing on neoclassical realism, the article proposes that certain domestic variables -government instability, limited party-system institutionalization, and powerful presidents -have diverted the attention of political elites and foreign policy executives from the challenges generated by a rising Brazil. Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis is used to test this hypothesis and other alternative explanations for the regional imbalance. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…Despite increased contestation to such an approach in its regional diplomacy (Malamud 2011;Burges 2015), Brazil applies pressure and launches initiatives, often through multilateral channels, to structure neighborhood relations and regional organizations in a way that benefits Brazil's interests, without posing as an aggressive neighbor. However, such institutional proactivity is also often accompanied by hesitancy in assuming the bulk of the associated costs.…”

Section: Brazil As a Rising Power: Regional Aspirationsmentioning

confidence: 99%