If one interprets China's sizable rise in Latin America as an unprecedented phenomenon, it follows that the concurrent story of declining U.S. influence in the region is an event hastily acknowledged at best and ignored at worst. In this article, we ask whether Chinese economic statecraft in Latin America is related to the declining U.S. hegemonic influence in the region and explore how. To do so we analyze foreign direct investments, bank loans, and international trade from 2003 to 2014, when China became a major player in the region. We use data from 21 Latin American countries, and find that an inversely proportional relationship exists between the investments made by Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), bank loans, manufacturing exports, and the U.S. hegemonic influence exerted in the region. In other words, Beijing has filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the latter's own backyard.

The iden of an integrnted Lntin Americnn region goes bnck to the enrly postindependence period, and yet, in s11bstance, Lnti11 American regionalism /ms remained far be/1ind its stated nims. Tlie perceived implementntion gnp /ins rnised t/1e question why policymakers continued to talk abo11t something they nppenred to nvoid in prnctice. Tl1is nrticle contributes to the dehnte 011 Lntin America's i11tegrntion gnp btJ exploriug the phe110111e11011 of declarnfory regionnlism-tfze prnctice of referring to the region m1d its institutions in politicnl speeches. Bnsed 011 quantitative text annlysis of the speec/1es presidents delivered an1111nlly nt tlze UN's General Assembly bctween 1994 nnd 2014, we slww tlznt tllis prnctice /ins not bee11 uniform. Presidents distinguish between different forms of regionnlism, integrntion nnd cooperntion, and frnme the geogrnphical region tl1ey refer to nccordingly. /11 111otivnti11g presidents to spenk nbout integrntion ns opposed to cooperntion, ideology nnd democrntic performnnce stand out ns cr11cial fnctors. We would also like to indicate lhal lhe stalbtical resulls we show can be replicaled using lhe coding and database available at the following Harvard Dataverse link: https: //dataverse.harvard. cdu/datasct. xhtml?pcrsistcntld=doi%3Al0.7910"/o2FOVN%2FUCWKGC Tue authors would like to thank the

In this article we summarize the precepts of Peripheral Realism, its place in the intellectual history of International Relations Theory, its contributions to interpreting Latin American international politics and its insights for the future. After revising the intellectual merits and tenets of the theory in the four initial sections, we show how it predicted the behavior of Latin American states under unipolarity. Finally, we review its implications for a world where China may hold economic primacy.

This article cxplores thc possibility of concciving South Amcrica and Southern Africa as subsystemic unipolaritics undcr Brazilian and South African primacy, rcspcctivcly. lt argues that this concept, whcn applicd to thcsc rcgions, shcds light not only on the long-tenn strategies behind thc Brazilian and South African fore ign policies towards their neighbourhood, but also on thc bchaviour of secondary regional powcrs and small statcs. This hypothcs is qucslions thc maxim that considcrations related to polarity affect great powers only. After examining the Brazilian and South African cases, the author undertakes a comparativc analysis of 17 countries in thcsc rcgions, showing that the behaviour of politically stablc countries in these rcgions is as prcdicted by theories of unipolarity.

IntroducciónEn la segunda década del siglo XXI, la percepción del surgimiento de nuevas potencias o estados emergentes comienza a cuestionar profundamente nuestra forma de concebir la política internacional. Se ha formado un amplio consenso en torno a la idea de que el poder en el mundo se encuentra más desconcentrado, especialmente en comparación con las dos décadas posteriores a la guerra fría, lo que estaría dando paso a un mundo más o menos multipolar, a un ascenso del resto (Zakaria 2008), que incluiría a Brasil, pero no necesariamente al resto de Sudamérica.En este trabajo pretendemos resumir las explicaciones realistas a este cambio en la política internacional a partir del «realismo neoclásico» (Rose 1998) y algunas ideas propias del «realismo de la periferia» (Russell y Tokatlian 2010). Para ello nos enfocaremos en el caso de una potencia emergente en particular: Brasil, e intentaremos desentrañar los determinantes de su ascenso y potencial hegemonía sobre la región.A continuación, en un primer apartado, analizaremos cómo el debate sobre las potencias emergentes encuadra en un corpus conceptual y teórico realista que aún así presenta limitaciones para explicar los procesos de cambio. En un segundo

Almost four decades have passed since the Argenrina-Brazil balance of power gave way to a Brazilian uncontested primacy in the Southern Cone. The peaceful and cooperative nature of this regional power transition poses an interesting puzzle for structurail theories and those concerned with the US-China transition. Why do cer.tain countries accept accommodation more le nie ntly, like Argentina did? I offer an explanatory model and use process tracing to show that key cooperative turns in this bilateral relationship-during the late l 970s and early 1990s-required concurre nt structural changes, both at the inte rnational and domestic levels. My conclusions suggest, against the prevalent narrative, that cooperation between Argentina a nd Brazil was not a product of democracy. Instead, peaceful power transitions take place when the costs of confrontation are high and social coalitions are largely redefined in the declining state. The structure of international politics in the Southern Cone has changed considerably over time. While today's scenario is one of cooperation under ßrazilian unipolari ty, Arge ntine preemine nce was patent a century before, and the two-centuriesold rivalry between these two countries was still in place not many decades ago

Quantifying the timing and content of policy changes affecting international travel and immigration is key to ongoing research on the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and the socioeconomic impacts of border closures. The COVID Border Accountability Project (COBAP) provides a hand-coded dataset of >1000 policies systematized to reflect a complete timeline of country-level restrictions on movement across international borders during 2020. Trained research assistants used pre-set definitions to source, categorize and verify for each new border policy: start and end dates, whether the closure is “complete” or “partial”, which exceptions are made, which countries are banned, and which air/land/sea borders were closed. COBAP verified the database through internal and external audits from public health experts. For purposes of further verification and future data mining efforts of pandemic research, the full text of each policy was archived. The structure of the COBAP dataset is designed for use by social and biomedical scientists. For broad accessibility to policymakers and the public, our website depicts the data in an interactive, user-friendly, time-based map.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Why have most countries in the region not implemented any consistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis-à-vis Brazil? Drawing on neoclassical realism, the article proposes that certain domestic variables -government instability, limited party-system institutionalization, and powerful presidents -have diverted the attention of political elites and foreign policy executives from the challenges generated by a rising Brazil. Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis is used to test this hypothesis and other alternative explanations for the regional imbalance. Terms of use: Documents in