The iden of an integrnted Lntin Americnn region goes bnck to the enrly postindependence period, and yet, in s11bstance, Lnti11 American regionalism /ms remained far be/1ind its stated nims. Tlie perceived implementntion gnp /ins rnised t/1e question why policymakers continued to talk abo11t something they nppenred to nvoid in prnctice. Tl1is nrticle contributes to the dehnte 011 Lntin America's i11tegrntion gnp btJ exploriug the phe110111e11011 of declarnfory regionnlism-tfze prnctice of referring to the region m1d its institutions in politicnl speeches. Bnsed 011 quantitative text annlysis of the speec/1es presidents delivered an1111nlly nt tlze UN's General Assembly bctween 1994 nnd 2014, we slww tlznt tllis prnctice /ins not bee11 uniform. Presidents distinguish between different forms of regionnlism, integrntion nnd cooperntion, and frnme the geogrnphical region tl1ey refer to nccordingly. /11 111otivnti11g presidents to spenk nbout integrntion ns opposed to cooperntion, ideology nnd democrntic performnnce stand out ns cr11cial fnctors. We would also like to indicate lhal lhe stalbtical resulls we show can be replicaled using lhe coding and database available at the following Harvard Dataverse link: https: //dataverse.harvard. cdu/datasct. xhtml?pcrsistcntld=doi%3Al0.7910"/o2FOVN%2FUCWKGC Tue authors would like to thank the

Since the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expanded its institutional outreach to span the broader Asia Pacific and new policy areas, a dominant orthodoxy has placed the organization at the center of the region's international order. More recently, uncertainty in the context of China's rise sheds doubt on ASEAN's apparent centrality to its procedurally driven transformation of foreign relations across East Asia. While theories of cooperation explain why and when minor powers choose to pool their resources, the reverse logic has hardly been considered. This paper shows that the particular type of ASEAN regionalism is not only a product of weak states' cooperation but that the lack of capacity also sets the limits for the regional project. Two case studies on intramural security elicit the limited effectiveness of ASEAN's endeavor to develop into a

Latin American militaries are today in many regards inoperative and obsolete as an instrument of defence. Yet, they seek to maintain their organisational power and privileges. Governments, on the other hand, lack the adequate means to fight criminality, persisting poverty and social inequality. In an apparent win-win situation, Latin American governments have used the military as a wildcard to step in where civilian state capacity falls short, including for urban and border patrols, literacy campaigns and to collect garbage, among many other tasks. The military's manifold internal use has been defended mainly based on pragmatic reasons. We argue instead that the ostensive pareto optimality between militaries and governments has had negative effects for civil-military relations from a democratic governance point of view that takes into consideration the efficiency and effectiveness of how the state delivers basic services across different policy areas.

No abstract

La integración regional en América Latina presenta una contradicción notable. Mientras que la retórica de los actores promueve avances en los procesos regionales, los hechos muestran resultados e instituciones mucho más débiles de lo que esa retórica sustenta. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo esclarecer empíricamente esta brecha, basado en el caso de Chile. A este fin empleamos una serie de indicadores que buscan captar el compromiso declarado con la integración, por un lado, y los esfuerzos y avances reales, por otro. El artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre el regionalismo latinoamericano con un aporte empírico, destacando algunos matices en la brecha entre los discursos y los hechos. * Este artículo fue elaborado con aportes del Concurso de Investigación ANEPE, código Inv-05-2013.

This article examines recent interest in hedging as a feature of international politics in the Asia Pacific. Focusing on the small states of Southeast Asia, we argue that dominant understandings of hedging are misguided for two reasons. Despite significant advances in the literature, hedging has remained a vague concept rendering it a residual category of foreign policy behavior. Moreover, current accounts of hedging tend to overstate the strategic intentions of ostensible hedgers. This article proposes that a better understanding of Southeast Asia’s foreign policy behavior needs to dissociate hedging from neorealist concepts of international politics. Instead, we locate the concept in the context of classical realism and the diplomatic practice of second-tier states. Exploring Southeast Asia’s engagement with more powerful actors from this perspective reveals the strategic limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the dilemma that Southeast Asian states face from a rising China challenging the status quo in the western Pacific.

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe's place in 21 st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe's neighbourhood and the wider world.

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.