If one interprets China's sizable rise in Latin America as an unprecedented phenomenon, it follows that the concurrent story of declining U.S. influence in the region is an event hastily acknowledged at best and ignored at worst. In this article, we ask whether Chinese economic statecraft in Latin America is related to the declining U.S. hegemonic influence in the region and explore how. To do so we analyze foreign direct investments, bank loans, and international trade from 2003 to 2014, when China became a major player in the region. We use data from 21 Latin American countries, and find that an inversely proportional relationship exists between the investments made by Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), bank loans, manufacturing exports, and the U.S. hegemonic influence exerted in the region. In other words, Beijing has filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the latter's own backyard.

Public opinion plays a growing role in foreign policy formation in democratic societies. In this study, we use survey data from The Americas and the World project to establish whether Latin Americans share a common regional identity, and regard Brazil as a regional leader. Our results indicate that the majority of Brazilians do not identify themselves as Latin Americans. Moreover, while they believe their country is the most suitable candidate for regional leadership, they are unwilling to bear the costs of assuming such a role. Our study also explores perceptions of regional identity and Brazilian leadership in other Latin American countries, based on their own respective power aspirations. It shows that less powerful Latin American nations recognise Brazil as a regional leader, but citizens in middle powers, like Argentina and Mexico, still believe their countries should play a prominent regional role.

Civil society plays an increasingly important role in the formulation of foreign policy in emerging countries. This article investigates whether public opinion is sensitive to framing effects regarding foreign policy. Data from a survey experiment with a sample of 1,530 students at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and the Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda, we find that participants are sensitive to framing effects on foreign affairs. The interviewees changed their preferences when stimulated by information regarding Brazilian economic growth and military expenditure in comparison with Argentina. In turn, this effect was more pronounced among a) people who tend to stay less informed regarding foreign affairs and b) individuals who are more nationalistic.

Since Hugo Chávez Frias assumed the Venezuelan presidency in 1999, Venezuela has strengthened ties with most of its Latin American neighbors, particularly those where sympathetic leftist administrations also managed to assume power, including Argentina. With our analysis we show: 1) that Argentine media, divided between pro-and anti-government positions, presents a polarized view of chavismo; and 2) that Argentine public opinion regarding Chávez is not necessarily divided on the basis of ideological affiliations (left-right), but rather by the rejection or support of the former Argentine government. With these findings, we argue that in such a polarized information environment, chavismo is a polarizing issue and a tool that can be exploited in the domestic realm.Key words: chavismo, Venezuela, Argentina, media, public opinion RESUMEN Desde la asunción de Hugo Chávez Frias a la presidencia en 1999, Venezuela estrechó vín-culos con la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos, particularmente con aquellos donde también arribaron al poder administraciones con orientaciones de izquierda, incluyendo

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This thesis seeks to be a contribution to a broader debate on how public opinion builds up its perceptions on foreign policy and foreign affairs. Its two main objectives are to examine: (a) which are the determinants that explain public opinion knowledge on foreign affairs; and (b) whether public opinion is sensitive to framing effects on this issue. The analysis was done by mixing quantitative methods and survey experiments, while its novelty is that brings unprecedent evidence from Latin America. The main findings of the thesis are twofold. On the one hand, Latin American public opinion knowledge on foreign affairs is low. In this regard, both traditional individual variables and contextual ones, namely the size of the city, are useful to predict a person's knowledge. On the other, public opinion perceptions regarding foreign policy, either presented on a general or specific way, are sensitive to framing effects. 2013/23251-9 and 2015/12860-0 (BEPE) has been extremely helpful in order to achieve this PhD. Moreover, I would like to thank my advisor Professor Janina Onuki for all her support and being an example of ethics since I arrived to Brazil in 2012. In addition, I would not like to forget of my co-advisor Anthony Pereira and all the staff of King's College London for their warming reception in London. Finally, I would like to mention Professors Vinicius de Carvalho, Gerardo Maldonado and Cristiane Lucena for their valuable comments and suggestions.

There is a broad array of literature analyzing the interaction between domestic and foreign policy. In this regard, we have recently seen that strategic politicians use divisive foreign leaders as a tool to take advantage of in domestic politics. Nevertheless, the use of these leaders in domestic campaigns-and particularly the reasons why this occurs-has not received much attention in academia. In this paper, we attempt to approach this topic by identifying when conditions are ripe for this strategic use of foreign leaders in domestic politics. More specifically, we argue that the image of foreign leaders can be used when they present the conditions to become a wedge issue. We explore this question by using survey data on views of Chávez across Latin America together with political and economic indicators between 2005 and 2011. We find that perceptions of Chavismo are divisive in countries in which the incumbent government is ruled by a left-wing administration. Similarly, we show that, in those countries, Chavismo has all the conditions to become a wedge issue, as opponents have a homogeneously negative perception of that political movement, while government supporters are divided in their views of Chavismo.