In the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, scholars of international relations debated how to best characterize the rising tide of global opposition. The concept of “soft balancing” emerged as an influential, though contested, explanation of a new phenomenon in a unipolar world: states seeking to constrain the ability of the United States to deploy military force by using multinational organizations, international law, and coalition building. Soft balancing can also be observed in regional unipolar systems. Multinational archival research reveals how Argentina, Mexico, and other Latin American countries responded to expanding U.S. power and military assertiveness in the early twentieth century through coordinated diplomatic maneuvering that provides a strong example of soft balancing. Examination of this earlier case makes an empirical contribution to the emerging soft-balancing literature and suggests that soft balancing need not lead to hard balancing or open conflict.

Context.—Both the regulations in the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) and the checklists of the College of American Pathologists (CAP) Laboratory Accreditation Program require clinical laboratories to verify performance characteristics of quantitative test systems. Laboratories must verify performance claims when introducing an unmodified, US Food and Drug Administration–cleared or approved test system, and they must comply with requirements for periodic calibration and calibration verification for existing test systems. They must also periodically verify the analytical measurement range of many quantitative test systems. Objective.—To provide definitions for many of the terms used in these regulations, to describe a set of basic analyses that laboratories may adapt to demonstrate compliance with both CLIA and the CAP Laboratory Accreditation Program checklists for performing calibration verification and for verifying the analytical measurement range of test systems, to review some of the recommended procedures for establishing performance goals, and to provide data illustrating the performance goals used in some of the CAP's calibration verification and linearity surveys. Data Sources.—The CAP's calibration verification and linearity survey programs, the CLIA regulations, the Laboratory Accreditation Program requirements, and published literature were used to meet these objectives. Conclusions.—Calibration verification and linearity and analytical measurement range verification should be performed using suitable materials with assessment of results using well-defined evaluation protocols. We describe the CAP's calibration verification and linearity programs that may be used for these purposes.

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asymmetrical relationships from the perspective of the weaker state. 2 This article proposes three forms of power that are available and particularly relevant to small states: particular-intrinsic, derivative, and collective power. All states, small or large, can either try to exploit their internal resources or turn to other states. However, because small states, by definition, lack more traditional forms of power, they must specialize in how they employ their resources and relationships. Small states depend more heavily on external options, whether a special relationship with a great power or other small states. This taxonomy explains the three forms of power according to their base, scope, means, and amount (Dahl 1957), which connects small states to broader debates around power in IR.The first section of the article examines the changing concepts of power employed in the study of small states. To some extent, these reflect broader debates about power in IR, though resources and compulsory power dominated until recently. The article then develops the taxonomy mentioned above by specifying the base, scope, means, and amount of the different types of power, and explaining these in relation to diverse concepts of power. In conclusion, the article addresses how these categories are particularly relevant to small states. Many small states are thriving in a world that is more open and democratic, where the threat of force has receded somewhat and has proven less effective. Non-traditional facets of power are central for states that lack coercive instruments, but they are increasingly relevant for all states. Concepts of Power in Studies of Small StatesPower remains both a central and contested term in International Relations. Guzzini (2005:495) argues that "the meaning of power is always embedded in a theoretical context." That is no less true in the case of power and the small state. As Berenskoetter (2007) notes, the concept of power in IR has been dominated by realismat the very least, the debate has occurred on realists' terms. Defined by their very weakness, small states struggled to gain respect in IR, a field long focused on the international competition for power. Goetschel (1998:13) colorfully writes: "Small states were seen as fragile creatures in the rough sea of international relations.They were internally well suited for democratic regimes but externally helpless and constantly 2 Elsewhere, I have suggested the terms "preponderant power" and "hypo-power" to describe states in asymmetrical relationships (Long 2016). Here, I continue to use the more common term "small state" in an attempt to connect with that literature.

A half century of debate about the definition of 'small state' has produced more fragmentation than consensus. Though there is impressive and growing empirical and conceptual richness in the field of small-state studies, fundamental definitional ambiguity remains a challenge. In particular, the lack of clarity over how to understand and delimit the central object of study has

Why do some states choose to recognize de facto states, even when this involves potential costs? We explore this question through the case of Paraguay–Taiwan relations, arguing that Paraguay uses its diplomatic recognition policy for status seeking, which generates intangible and material benefits that offset the macroeconomic opportunity costs of foregone Chinese investment, aid and credit. We build an econometric model to estimate Paraguay's “Taiwan cost” and then develop a qualitative case study that draws on semi-structured interviews with actors in Paraguayan foreign policymaking to explain the domestic dynamics that underpin the relationship. We advance recent work on small states’ pursuit of international status by illustrating how small and de facto states follow different status-seeking rationales than those commonly recognized in the literature. We also build on that literature by exploring how elite structures shape status seeking. Though unusual, the case of Paraguay–Taiwan relations has broader implications for bilateral relationships with de facto states and status-seeking strategies of small states.

Latin America Confronts the United States offers a new perspective on US-Latin America relations. Drawing on research in six countries, the book examines how Latin American leaders are able to overcome power asymmetries to influence US foreign policy. The book provides in-depth explorations of key moments in post-World War II inter-American relations - foreign economic policy before the Alliance for Progress, the negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaties, the expansion of trade through NAFTA, and the growth of counternarcotics in Plan Colombia. The new evidence challenges earlier, US-centric explanations of these momentous events. Though differences in power were fundamental to each of these cases, relative weakness did not prevent Latin American leaders from aggressively pursuing their interests vis-à-vis the United States. Drawing on studies of foreign policy and international relations, the book examines how Latin American leaders achieved this influence - and why they sometimes failed.

Although Latin America plays a minimal role in debates on the 'liberal international order', scholars recognize the region's influence on international law, norms, and institutions. We contend that these Latin American contributions to international order spring from a tradition of 'republican internationalism', rooted in the region's domestic political traditions and practices. Republican principles such as the separation of power, association, and the rule of law had important corollaries in Latin American international relations, including sovereign equality, confederation and regional cooperation, and international law and arbitration. These republican internationalist ideas shaped Latin America's diplomatic traditions and its contributions to international order in the nineteenth century and beyond. Attention to republican internationalism and Latin American contributions demonstrates how actors beyond the North Atlantic shaped the origins of international order. This study also advances debates on the sources of the liberal international order by demonstrating the distinctive influence of republican ideas and practices.