A Governança Corporativa Influencia a Eficiência das Empresas Brasileiras?

Abstract

Conflicts of interest between managers and owners is an oft-studied issue in academia, first documented by Berle and Means in 1932, which exposes the classic conflict of interest between agent and principal discussed in agency theory. The premise of corporate governance is that people in corporations do not necessarily act in funders' best interest. Based on this assumption, this study investigates the influence of aspects of corporate governance on the efficiency of publicly traded Brazilian companies. The study combines static optimization techniques through data envelopment analysis (DEA) to identify the efficiency of publicly traded companies, using panel data to identify the influence of corporate governance on company efficiency. The data were manually collected from 20-F reports from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for Brazilian companies that had American depositary receipts (ADRs) because the database is not entirely available in Brazil. Many of the hypotheses were confirmed, thereby showing the particular conditions of corporate finance in Brazil with respect to corporate governance. The immaturity of the Brazilian capital market is perceived in various analyses, emphasizing that the history of the Brazilian corporate system is one of the limiting factors of the efficiency of companies. The conditions that prevail are the following: (i) high ownership-management overlap; (ii) boards with low effectiveness; (iii) in family groups, the poor definitions of the roles of stockholders, boards and management; (iv) the lack of clarity related to the cost-benefit relationship for good governance; (v) inefficiency of the boards of directors and (vi) evidence of conflicts of interests, diminished by explicit and implicit incentives.

Analysis of the compliance of Brazilian firms with good corporate governance practices

“…In this context, studies have documented that, in fact, companies with better corporate governance practices present more favorable performance than the others, both in the Brazilian (Crisóstomo & Melo Júnior, 2015;Fernandes, Dias & Cunha, 2010;Lima, Oliveira, Cabral, Santos & Pessoa, 2015;Macedo & Corrar, 2012;Procianoy & Verdi, 2009;Srour, 2005) and international scenario (Alves and Mendes, 2004;Azeez, 2015;Black, Jang, & Kim 2006;Brick & Chidambaran, 2010;Drobetz, Schillhofer, & Zimmermann, 2004;Duru, Iyengar, & Zampelli, 2016;Elsayed, 2007;Franco & Montalván, 2010;Goncharov, Werner & Zimmermann, 2006, Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006Henry, 2010). Despite these results, previous research in Brazil has found results in the direction that companies still do not envision a favorable cost-benefit relation with the adoption of recommended corporate governance practices, which may be constraining the advance in adopting good corporate governance practices (Brandão & Crisóstomo, 2015;Sonza & Kloeckner, 2014).…”

Níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa e a probabilidade de violação dos covenants financeiros

“…O objetivo da governança corporativa é diminuir os problemas de agência nos setores privado e público (Miglani, Ahmed, & Henry, 2015;Dawson, Denfrod, Williams, Preston & Desouza, 2016), sendo utilizada para garantir o retorno dos investimentos dos acionistas (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). As companhias que implantam as boas práticas de governança corporativa transmitem mais segurança ao investidor, refletindo na valorização, na eficiência operacional e na redução dos custos de agência (Robicheaux, Fun & Ligon, 2007;Silva, Santos & Almeida, 2011;Gondrige, Clemente & Espej, 2012;Sonza & Kloeckner, 2014;Mapurunga, Ponte & Oliveira, 2015;Baioco & Almeida, 2017;Machado & Gartner, 2018).…”