The purpose of the paper is to examine the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and firm performance, taking into account firm value and financial performance, in an emerging market-Brazil. Content analysis was conducted to extract data from two different sources, one relative to CSR data (IBase) and another that provided financial data (Economática). CSR indexes and financial performance measures were calculated to allow the estimation of regression analysis conducted to examine the relationship between CSR and performance. The results indicate that CSR is value destroying in Brazil since a negative correlation between CSR and firm value was found. Additionally, a neutral relationship characterizes the mutual effect between CSR and financial performance. The study has examined the relationship between CSR and firm performance in a country where, as in most other non-developed markets, such relationship has not been object of research. Besides, we also see the use of a three dimensional measure of CSR, mainly considering a research undertaken in an emerging market, as a valuable contribution.

This study uses a sample of 213 Brazilian firms listed between 1995 and 2004 to examine the effect of the presence or absence of growth opportunities on the subsequent effect of leverage, dividend payout, and ownership concentration on firm value. First, we find that leverage plays a dual role: whereas it negatively affects the value of firms with growth opportunities (i.e., underinvestment theory), it positively affects the value of firms without growth opportunities (i.e., overinvestment theory). Second, we find that dividends play a disciplinary role in firms with fewer growth opportunities by reducing free cash flow under managerial control. Finally, the results show that ownership structure has a nonlinear effect-that is, ownership concentration initially improves the value of most firms. However, after a certain threshold, in firms with growth opportunities, the risk increases that large shareholders expropriate wealth at the expense of minority shareholders.

This article investigates, in the Brazilian capital market, the effect of the composition of the board of directors on executive compensation sensitivity to market performance, known as pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). Due to potential agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders and between shareholders and managers, members of the board of directors of the executive board or those appointed by the controlling shareholder might have less independence, something which may compromise monitoring effectiveness and, consequently, reduce the PPS. The purpose is contributing to understand the agency conflicts that have taken place in the Brazilian capital market and to define the configuration of the monitoring and compensation mechanisms that minimize total agency costs, maximizing shareholders’ wealth. The research results have implications for understanding the agency relations and for corporate governance in the Brazilian capital market. It is concluded that the relation between the monitoring exercised by the board of directors and executive compensation is a condition for its effectiveness as a governance mechanism in the Brazilian capital market. Data within the period 2013-2015 from 92 companies that participate in the Brazil 100 Index (IBRX 100) of the São Paulo Stock, Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) were analyzed. In addition to tests of difference between mean values and correlation, estimates were processed through feasible generalized least squares modeling. The independence of the board of directors vis-à-vis the controlling shareholder and the executive board may work as a corporate governance mechanism supplementing executive compensation. The results of this study indicate that the proportion of executives and independent members in the board of directors reduces the PPS, a measurement for executive compensation effectiveness made operational by the contemporary relation between increased managers’ compensation and increased company’s market value.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to verify the existence of financial constraints for investment in Brazil, an emerging market with growing international visibility. Design/methodology/approach – Using panel data methodology and generalized method of moments (GMM), the paper estimates dynamic investment models based on the Euler equation and Tobin's q for a panel data set of 199 Brazilian non-financial firms for the time period 1995-2006. Findings – Results show that Brazilian firms face financial constraints since their investments depend on internally generated funds. Results are robust to different investment models based on the Euler equation, also controlling for growth opportunities. Significant investment-cash flow sensitivity has been found for the whole sample of firms. Subsamples of firms considered as under financial constraints, according to dividend payout and equity issuance policies, have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially constrained firms in Brazil is higher than that in the UK and in Romania, a transition economy. Originality/value – The results extend empirical evidence of financial constraints in Brazil. The paper contributes to the literature by assessing the firms’ financial constraint status on an annual basis, and by using panel data methodology and GMM to estimate dynamic models of investment that take into account the proposals of the hierarchy of finance theory. In addition, the paper controls for growth opportunities. Capital market imperfections affect firm investment in Brazil and such effects are even stronger for financially constrained firms.

The relationship between ownership concentration and corporate governance quality is analyzed in Brazil. Models are estimated by the system generalized method of moments (GMM) for a balanced panel of 85 companies in the period 2010-2013. The results indicate that the concentration of ownership has an adverse effect on the quality of corporate governance, as measured by an index based on 28 voluntary good governance practices. The negative linear relationship indicates that large shareholders are unfavorable to adoption of best corporate governance practices. Additionally, the negative quadratic relationship reinforces this result to high levels of concentration highlighting the possibility of expropriation of minority shareholders. Less ownership concentration favors the quality of corporate governance suggesting that the need for coalition to control decreases the power of the main shareholder, possibly helping to alleviate the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders under the principal-principal agency model theoretical framework.

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Resumo: Em nível mundial há uma tendência de avaliação do ensino superior, considerando-se aspectos institucionais e de desempenho discente. No Brasil, o tema tem sido debatido há algum tempo com processos concretos de avaliação sendo implantados recentemente. ANALYZING MANAGEMENT INDEXES OF FEDERAL UNIVERSITIES AGAINST STUDENTS' PERFORMANCE AT ENADEAbstract: There a trend toward the evaluation of higher education in many countries, taking into account institutional management and student performance. In Brazil, the topic has been debated for some time with concrete evaluation experiences recently. Federal Universities (IFES) are evaluated through management indexes proposed by TCU (Federal Court of Audit). Meanwhile, students are evaluated by ENADE (National Examination of Student Performance). In a certain way, management indexes may be additional instruments for IFES management. The purpose of this work is analyzing possible relations between management indexes and students' performance at ENADE. We have analyzed a sample of 52 IFES in the period 2006-2008. Results signal that, indeed, some management indexes seem to be able to influence students' performance. This is the case, for example, of the cost by student that has shown a positive effect on students' performance.

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