Manuscript type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper analyses the influence of large shareholders on firm value using a sample of firms from 11 European countries, specifically considering how the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms and the contestability of control of the largest shareholder affect the value of the family-owned firms. Research Findings/Insights: We find that increased contestability of the control of the largest shareholder increases the value of family-owned firms. Results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family, a second family shareholder reduces firm value. Conversely, an institutional investor as second shareholder increases firm value. Likewise, better legal protection of shareholders not members of the controlling coalition increases the value of family firms. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We explore an under-examined aspect of agency conflict -contestability between large, dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. We highlight the role of the second and third largest shareholders, in terms of share and type of shareholder. We suggest the need for new avenues of research focused on the dynamics of power within the firm. Finally, we identify a situation in which conflict of interest becomes prominent. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study corroborates policymakers' concerns regarding the protection of rights of minority shareholders. We suggest the need for a stronger macro governance environment to facilitate minority shareholder participation in corporate decision making. Our study also lends support to balanced ownership structures with multiple large shareholders as a way to increase the firm's performance. Managers would also better serve shareholders' interests by not limiting their attention to the current controlling coalition.

This study uses a sample of 213 Brazilian firms listed between 1995 and 2004 to examine the effect of the presence or absence of growth opportunities on the subsequent effect of leverage, dividend payout, and ownership concentration on firm value. First, we find that leverage plays a dual role: whereas it negatively affects the value of firms with growth opportunities (i.e., underinvestment theory), it positively affects the value of firms without growth opportunities (i.e., overinvestment theory). Second, we find that dividends play a disciplinary role in firms with fewer growth opportunities by reducing free cash flow under managerial control. Finally, the results show that ownership structure has a nonlinear effect-that is, ownership concentration initially improves the value of most firms. However, after a certain threshold, in firms with growth opportunities, the risk increases that large shareholders expropriate wealth at the expense of minority shareholders.

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(2015) 'Congurations of capacity for change in entrepreneurial threshold rms : imprinting and strategic choice perspectives.', Journal of management studies., 52 (4). pp. 506-530. Further information on publisher's website:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joms.12121 Publisher's copyright statement: This is the accepted version of the following article: Judge, W. Q., Wei Hu, H., Gabrielsson, J., Talaulicar, T., Witt, M. A., Zattoni, A., Lopez-Iturriaga, F., Chen, J., Shukla, D., Quttainah, M., Adegbite, E., Luis Rivas, J. Kibler, B. (2015). Congurations of capacity for change in entrepreneurial threshold rms: Imprinting and strategic choice perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 52(4): 506-530, which has been published in nal form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joms.12121. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Configurations of Capacity for Change in Entrepreneurial Threshold Firms: Imprinting and Strategic Choice PerspectivesABSTRACT Imprinting theory suggests that founding conditions are 'stamped' on organizations, and these imprinted routines often resist change. In contrast, strategic choice theory suggests that the firm can overcome organizational inertia and deliberately choose its future. Both theories offer dramatically different explanations behind an organization's capacity for change. IPO firms provide a unique context for exploring how imprinting forces interact with strategic choice factors to address organizational capacity for change as a firm moves from private to public firm status. Juxtaposing imprinting and strategic choice perspectives, we employ fuzzy set to examine the multi-level determinants of organizational capacity for change.Our cross-national data reveals three effective configurations of organizational capacity for change within IPOs, and two ineffective configurations. Our results suggest that the antecedents of organizational capacity for change in entrepreneurial threshold firms are nonlinear, interdependent, and equifinal.Word Count: 138 (< 150)

We analyse the relation between capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate value for a sample of 1,216 firms from 15 European countries. Our results stress two different conflicts of interest and show the differential role played by the mechanisms of corporate control depending on the legal and institutional environment. In common law countries, as a consequence of the relationships between managers and shareholders, capital structure and managerial ownership are the most effective mechanisms of control. In civil law countries, however, as a consequence of the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, the ownership concentration and the sharing of control within the firm become crucial. In this scenario, the second reference shareholder plays a critical role in contesting the control of the dominant largest shareholder in order to reduce the extraction of private benefits and improve the firm's performance. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.