Manuscript type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper analyses the influence of large shareholders on firm value using a sample of firms from 11 European countries, specifically considering how the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms and the contestability of control of the largest shareholder affect the value of the family-owned firms. Research Findings/Insights: We find that increased contestability of the control of the largest shareholder increases the value of family-owned firms. Results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family, a second family shareholder reduces firm value. Conversely, an institutional investor as second shareholder increases firm value. Likewise, better legal protection of shareholders not members of the controlling coalition increases the value of family firms. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We explore an under-examined aspect of agency conflict -contestability between large, dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. We highlight the role of the second and third largest shareholders, in terms of share and type of shareholder. We suggest the need for new avenues of research focused on the dynamics of power within the firm. Finally, we identify a situation in which conflict of interest becomes prominent. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study corroborates policymakers' concerns regarding the protection of rights of minority shareholders. We suggest the need for a stronger macro governance environment to facilitate minority shareholder participation in corporate decision making. Our study also lends support to balanced ownership structures with multiple large shareholders as a way to increase the firm's performance. Managers would also better serve shareholders' interests by not limiting their attention to the current controlling coalition.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of macroeconomic‐industrial and bank‐specific factors on Latin American banks’ performance. Design/methodology/approach Using the data panel system estimator version of the generalized method of moments, the authors estimate the determinants of return on assets and interest margin for a sample of 78 commercial banks from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, México, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela over the period from 1995 to 2010. Findings On the one hand, the results show that bank performance is positively related to both idiosyncratic factors, such as service diversification, size, capital ratio, and specialization degree, and to macroeconomic‐industrial factors such as economic growth, inflation, and bank concentration. On the other hand, the results show that bank performance is negatively related to credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational inefficiencies. Originality/value The authors provide new evidence from the Latin American bank industry and incorporate the effect of diversification through noninterest activities.

This article analyses the effect of institutional ownership in alleviating or exacerbating the conflicts of interests among stakeholders in different legal and institutional frameworks. This analysis is carried out based on two characteristics: the concentration of power of institutional ownership and the identification of the main types of institutional investors. In common law countries, consistent with the convergence and entrenchment hypotheses, we find a U-shape relation between ownership structure and firm performance. In civil law countries, consistent with the collusion and contest theories, we find an inverted U-shape relation. We also find that when institutional investors are classified as pressure resistant and pressure sensitive according to the strength of their ties with managers, pressureresistant investors, who operate more independently, are the most capable of improving the value of the firm.

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We analyze whether the adoption of voluntary disclosures practices on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by several communicational channels has influence over financial performance and corporate reputation. Once we identify four CSR dimensions (social, ethical, environmental, partners)

Articulo de publicación ISIWe analyze the effect of two types of corporate diversification (business diversification and ownership diversification) on the market value of the Chilean firms. For a sample of 83 nonfinancial firms listed on the Santiago Stock Market from 2005 to 2013, we find a discount for both business and ownership diversification, which is consistent with that reported for other economic or institutional settings. Second, we find that the business diversification discount is related to the ownership structure and is due to the excess of the largest shareholders’ control rights. Third, we find that the ownership diversification discount becomes a premium when the ownership diversification enables the control of the affiliated firms. This effect can be explained by the improvement of internal capital markets that allows overcoming the limitations of Chilean external capital marketsChilean Fondecyt Grant 11110021 Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation ECO2011-29144-C03-0

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence about the effects of the MILA agreement in terms of improving financial market efficiency. Design/methodology/approach The authors measure efficiency by studying the stock reaction to earnings announcements using a conditional heteroscedasticity generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-adjusted market model and the most commonly implemented event study tests for 3,399 events across four countries in the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA). Findings Contrary to expectations, the results show that the MILA agreement has isolated gains in terms of reaction to corporate earnings announcements, which translates into partial improvements in market efficiency. However, the evidence indicates that the MILA agreement favored cointegration, which is in line with other studies. Practical implications This paper provides evidence for policymakers and regulators that a stock market agreement is a condition that promotes market cointegration, but it is not an element that in itself ensures an improvement in market efficiency. To achieve greater MILA benefits, regulatory and market-level changes are required. Originality/value This is the first study that analyses the effect of a stock market agreement on the efficiency of markets, expanding on what has been studied in the finance literature regarding the influence of these agreements on cointegration.