This article analyses the foreign policy of two post-neutral EU member states, Sweden and Finland. Both these Nordic states have adjusted their past policies of neutrality in favour of extended participation in the European and transatlantic security community. Yet within a similar and comparable pattern of change, there are two very significant differences between them: their views towards future membership in NATO and their choice of military strategy. The article utilizes an analytical framework that treats neutrality as an institutionalized idea containing causal and principled beliefs. The persistence of neutrality as a guiding principle of policy depends on feedback regarding: (1) its strategic usefulness (implications for security) as well as (2) its social appropriateness (implications for identity). The feedback mechanisms are related in the sense that the self-interested element of military non-alignment for the sake of security needs to be compensated by an appropriate role, such as demonstrating responsibility and engagement in international issues. Having taken a more autonomous decision, although with a historical record of shortcomings as regards declared neutrality, Sweden has been more dependent than Finland in ensuring that its respective policy of neutrality is complemented by an appropriate international role. This was possible during the Cold War, yet became increasingly difficult after the collapse of the bipolar world order. Thus, the analysis undertaken suggests, paradoxically, that in order to remain militarily non-aligned, Sweden has come to favour a more European outlook at the expense of the integrity of its policy of neutrality.

In no other policy arena are party unity and national unity considered as critical as in security and foreign policy. Party unity on foreign policy is viewed as a national security strategy of particular importance in times of international crisis and uncertainty, or as an expression of party strategy and ideological considerations. Through an empirical study of programs, congresses, voters and ideology of the Swedish parties 1945^1993, we show that the presence or absence of tension in the international system does not a¡ect the inclination of parties to take issue on matters of foreign policy. We also show that parties argue just as much about issues that are central to Swedish security policy as they do about issues that do not directly a¡ect national interest. The main sources of party disagreement over foreign policy seem to be ideologically motivated. Foreign Policy and Party PoliticsIn no other policy arena are party unity and national unity considered as critical as in matters pertaining to security and foreign policy. In these matters, political parties are expected to put aside their di¡erences in order to attain unity across party lines. Operating within a small non-aligned country, during the Cold War situated between East and West, Swedish political parties have had particular expectations placed upon them to avoid coming to blows over matters of foreign policy. A domestic tumult could dismantle the credibility that Swedish neutrality has managed, in spite of various obstacles, to establish in the post-war period. However, there are many examples of intense arguments in the foreign policy ¢eld between the parties during the post-war years. As restrictions on Swedish parties have been so severe, an empirical investigation of party strategic and party ideological motives compared with actually politicized issues could deepen our understanding of parties' strategic and ideological dilemmas in foreign policy issues. Through a longitudinal case study of Swedish party positions

In this article we compare the structuring of citizens' attitudes on foreign policy issues in the U.S.A. and Sweden. Most of the studies in this area have been carried out on U.S. data, which have made any generalization of the findings to other states difficult. The material is the 1995 SOM study, with a sample of 2,800 individuals. Swedish citizens' foreign policy attitudes were structured along two dimensions. The first dimension showed similarities with Wittkopf's “militant internationalism” dimension; the second dimension showed similarities with Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis's “multilateralism‐unilateralism” dimension. As in the United States, ideology has a high explanatory power on individuals' placement on the first dimension, but in Sweden gender and attitudes on “green issues” have some additional explanatory power. On the second dimension education has high explanatory power in both Sweden and the U.S.A., but in Sweden attitudes on “green issues” are also of importance. In the article we argue for a plausible theoretical interpretation of the Swedish foreign policy dimensions that is somewhat different from the one offered in the American case.

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion of how the gender gap in foreign and security policy issues can be explained by examining how early the gender differences manifest themselves. All told, 251 Swedish children between the ages of six and nine were interviewed about their views on foreign aid, refugee policy, weapons exports, armed resistance, self-defense, and concern or fear about the outbreak of war. Opinion differences between boys and girls were then compared to the differences between adult men and women. The results showed that the differences between boys and girls were very small or nonexistent. Only in the question of fear about the outbreak of war did girls differ significantly from boys, displaying a much higher degree of worry. In the conclusion, these results are discussed in relation to different theories about the causes of the gender gap in foreign policy issues.

The article analyses Sweden as a critic and as a mediator and bridge-builder on the international arena since 1945. Some researchers have claimed that in the mid-1960s Sweden took on the role of critic at the expense of that of mediator. Was this true? Has Sweden's participation in international opinion-building had a negative effect on her usefulness as mediator or bridge-builder in international conflicts? And what role do the actions of a nation as critic play for the image of that state as an impartial mediator? First, the relevance of a mediator/bridge-builder's impartiality is discussed. Thereafter, Sweden as critic and mediator/bridge-builder since 1945 is presented. Sweden's actions in two concrete cases are focused on the Vietnam and Iran-Iraq wars. In both cases Sweden tried to combine the role of mediator and bridge-builder with that of critic. Finally, some general conclusions are formulated about the relationship between the role of critic and that of mediator/bridge-builder. The results show that in the mid-1960s Sweden began to take part in international opinion-building and to formulate criticism of other countries to a much greater extent than previously. But Sweden's taking on of the critic's role in the 1960s was not followed by a decrease in her mediation or bridge-building missions. The hypothesis that Sweden took on the critic's role at the expense of the mediator's role is thus not supported in this study. It is concluded that there are no objections to a country that wants to act as a mediator or bridge-builder taking an active part in international opinion-building or formulating criticism of other countries in terms of different issues. But restrictions on criticism and attitudes come up in conflicts where that country is also acting as a mediator or bridge-builder.