From Nordic neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish policy transformation

Abstract

This article analyses the foreign policy of two post-neutral EU member states, Sweden and Finland. Both these Nordic states have adjusted their past policies of neutrality in favour of extended participation in the European and transatlantic security community. Yet within a similar and comparable pattern of change, there are two very significant differences between them: their views towards future membership in NATO and their choice of military strategy. The article utilizes an analytical framework that treats neutrality as an institutionalized idea containing causal and principled beliefs. The persistence of neutrality as a guiding principle of policy depends on feedback regarding: (1) its strategic usefulness (implications for security) as well as (2) its social appropriateness (implications for identity). The feedback mechanisms are related in the sense that the self-interested element of military non-alignment for the sake of security needs to be compensated by an appropriate role, such as demonstrating responsibility and engagement in international issues. Having taken a more autonomous decision, although with a historical record of shortcomings as regards declared neutrality, Sweden has been more dependent than Finland in ensuring that its respective policy of neutrality is complemented by an appropriate international role. This was possible during the Cold War, yet became increasingly difficult after the collapse of the bipolar world order. Thus, the analysis undertaken suggests, paradoxically, that in order to remain militarily non-aligned, Sweden has come to favour a more European outlook at the expense of the integrity of its policy of neutrality.

Still a Physician rather than a Judge? The Post‐Cold War Foreign and Security Policy of Finland

“…On the other hand, the treaty took into account Finland's desire to stay outside great power conflicts. (Möller and Bjereld , 373; Rieker , 95. )…”

“…It was a pragmatic choice aimed at sending a message to the West that Finland is “an independent democracy, not a Soviet satellite” (Jakobson , 74). Finland's participation in peacekeeping was from the outset linked to improving its image in the West (Kronlund and Valla , 444–446; Möller and Bjereld , 374; Rieker , 95).…”

Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union

“…Distance now meant being detached from the new dynamism of the ‘New Europe’ (Wæver , 4). Rather than relying on the Nordic tradition of togetherness and unity, Sweden and Finland seemed to strive for individualization of their foreign policies (Schumacher ; Von Sydow , 24), each applying different strategies to prevent geopolitical marginalisation (Ingebritsen ; Möller & Bjereld ). As a consequence of its geopolitical awareness (see Moisio & Harle ), Finland aimed to capitalize on its newly gained independence from Soviet Russia by strongly aspiring towards deep integration with Western Europe and by adopting the proactive style of a ‘unilateral Europeanist’ (Ojanen , 408).…”

‘Neutrality: A really dead concept?’ A reprise

“…Kite likewise points to the importance of these traditions in the Nordic countries' participation in European security policy (2006: 107), while Miles has elaborated the importance of domestic pressures from a 'fusion' perspective (2006; see also Hallenberg, 2000). Möller and Bjereld (2010) have more recently attempted to meld interests and identity into a framework that sees neutrality as an 'institutionalized' idea, with causal and principled beliefs as well as strategic and security variables to show distinctions and convergences between Finland and Sweden. By 'layering' more nuanced and complex levels of analysis, these works point not only to divergences between states, and the need to take specificity seriously, they also demonstrate that beliefs and values also have an important connection to more institutionalized methods of understanding foreign and security policy.…”

“…The shift to a concept of 'comprehensive security' in the Nordic countries, for instance, moves away from military defence to safeguarding the basic functions of society (2006: 274-81; see also Forsberg, 2002;Rieker, 2002;Möller and Bjereld, 2010). As security becomes more complex, the demarcation between internal and external security erodes the neat lines of sovereign division that provided the rationale and context for neutrality.…”