Computer P u b l i s h e d b y t h e I E E E C o m p u t e r S o c i e t ycols because designers can use it to evaluate theoretical systems. However, if the simulation doesn't reflect an important aspect of reality, it can't give insight into the operating characteristics of the system the developers are studying. Generalization and lack of rigor can lead to inaccurate data, which can result in wrong conclusions or inappropriate implementation decisions.Consider, for example, the inappropriate exercise of feature isolation. Investigators can use simulation to isolate target features by varying only those features, while holding all other parameters constant. Many manet simulations compare protocols by varying only the protocol in each simulation run.Unfortunately, the constant factors can (passively) inject inaccuracies into the simulation. This type of unintended side effect can occur when, for example, investigators run a simulation with protocol A and subsequently run the identical simulation with protocol B. Intuitively, with all other settings the same, the protocol that performs the best head-to-head should have the better performance. However, this isn't necessarily true.In reality, static features can dominate performance. For example, protocol A might outperform B at 10-megabits-per-second (mbps) bandwidth, but the converse might be true at 100 mbps. Worse yet, even if the simulation results reflect these two situations, they'd say little about performance in a 50-mbps or 500-mbps network. Omitting such intermediate-valued tests can lead to false conclusions. Determining which features to vary, how much to vary them, and in what combinations with which other features to simulate them is difficult. Often, the volume of interaction possibilities precludes thorough simulation, leading to less than rigorous validaSimulation is useful for evaluating protocol performance and operation. However, the lack of rigor with which it's applied threatens the credibility of the published research within the manet research community. Todd R. Andel and Alec YasinsacFlorida State University M obile ad hoc networks (manets) allow rapid deployment because they don't depend on a fixed infrastructure. Manet nodes can participate as the source, the destination, or an intermediate router. This flexibility is attractive for military applications, disaster-response situations, and academic environments where fixed networking infrastructures might not be available.Simulation has proven to be a valuable tool in many areas where analytical methods aren't applicable and experimentation isn't feasible. Researchers generally use simulation to analyze system performance prior to physical design or to compare multiple alternatives over a wide range of conditions. Unfortunately, errors in simulation models or improper data analysis often produce incorrect or misleading results.The mainstream approach in the manet research community follows the development, simulation, and publish process. Manet publications typically include performance s...

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The existing automotive Controller Area Network (CAN) is vulnerable. The absence of sender verification in its communication means that an attacker acting as a node on its network will be treated like a legitimate node that has always been present, allowing attackers to transmit and receive messages freely. This paper proposes a system that will allow nodes using CAN to identify legitimate messages and reject those that come from illegitimate nodes. In addition, the system provides resistance against replay attacks that can clog up the safety-critical real time networks.

Vehicles made within the past years have gradually become more and more complex. As a result, the embedded computer systems that monitor and control these systems have also grown in size and complexity. Unfortunately, the technology that protects them from external attackers has not improved at a similar rate. In this paper we discuss the vulnerabilities of modern in-vehicle networks, focusing on the Controller Area Network (CAN) communications protocol as a primary attack vector. We discuss the vulnerabilities of CAN, the types of attacks that can be used against it, and some of the solutions that have been proposed to overcome these attacks.

The demand for cybersecurity professions faces continual shortages. Real-world cyber threats continue to drive this demand as we face a daily barrage of attacks on our critical infrastructure, national, and private industry assets. To meet this demand, many cybersecurity and information assurance educational programs have emerged. These programs range from specialized tracks within traditional academic programs to specialized degree titles developed solely for the purpose of producing cyber capable graduates.In this paper we document curriculum development that focuses on a systems level approach to cyber assurance education. This program incorporates both hardware and software aspects to ensure cyber security graduates are produced that can address adversaries that target complete system implementations.