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We use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a switching regressions model to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice, and find that in our sample, (i) the choice by local public authorities to engage in a PPP is not random, and (ii) conditional on the choice of a PPP, consumer prices are significantly higher on average. Copyright Springer 2006Contractual Choices, Public-Private Partnerships, Public Services, Transaction Costs, Water supply, H0, H7, K00, L33,

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[eng] Given their potential to affect contract law, antitrust policy, and business practice, it is important that theories of contracting stand on an empirical footing as solid as possible. This article reviews the empirical literature on contracting with emphasis on the relative contributions of agency and transaction cost theories. After describing their common underlying structure, we discuss the theories' testable implications and the associated econometric evidence. Of the two, transaction cost economics has had more success both generating predictions and explaining contracting behavior. [fre] Parce qu'elles sont susceptibles d'influer sur les législations contractuelles, les politiques et les pratiques industrielles, il est important que les théories des contrats se basent, autant que possible, sur des travaux empiriques solides. Cet article fait un bilan de ces études en insistant plus particulièrement sur les contributions de la théorie de l'agence et de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Après une brève présentation de ces approches théoriques, nous discutons des propositions testables qu'elles génèrent et des résultats des travaux économétriques sur le sujet. Des deux, la théorie des coûts de transaction est celle qui a eu le plus de succès pour générer des propositions et expliquer les comportements contractuels.

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Most empirical studies concerning franchise systems have dealt with the monetary contractual provisions, especially with the determinants of royalty rates. But the organizational design of franchised chains has received less attention and dual distribution is still a misunderstood phenomenon in economic theory. What determines the proportion of company-owned units or franchised units within a chain? How does the level of the royalty rate interplay with the extent of company ownership? This paper supports the idea that dual distribution enables to mitigate contractual hazards due to information asymmetry and incomplete contracting. Thus a chain's efficiency should strongly depend on the correct balance between royalty rates and the extent of company ownership. The interdependence between these two strategic decisions is analyzed by using a panel data set of 745 French franchisors. Econometric tests show that brand name value has a positive impact both on Thierry Pénard is affiliated with the University of Rennes 1 and CREREG, 7 place Hoche 35065 Rennes, royalty rates and the proportion of company-owned units. Moreover, we put forth evidence that royalties and company ownership are complementary variables for the organizational design of chains.

Public-private partnership (PPP) policy strategies emphasize the ability of PPPs to foster innovation. Evidence reported in literature supports less the inherent quality of PPPs for innovation and more the importance of contributing factors. The contractual agreement is the setting of these factors. In this context, an analytical model based on behavioural economics is presented, with boundary conditions reflecting various contractual configurations. The analysis indicates why, from a purely economic point of view, the private party in a PPP arrangement has an incentive to invest in low risk incremental innovations, which impact on, and positively effect, cost savings during construction and operation. It is also identified that further innovations are hampered by the ability to produce verifiable improvements correlated to performance. Findings contribute to the subject of public procurement for innovation in PPPs and support public authorities regarding the rationale, potential and necessary framework conditions for the use of public procurement as an innovation policy tool.