Econometrics of Contracts : an Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting

Abstract

[eng] Given their potential to affect contract law, antitrust policy, and business practice, it is important that theories of contracting stand on an empirical footing as solid as possible. This article reviews the empirical literature on contracting with emphasis on the relative contributions of agency and transaction cost theories. After describing their common underlying structure, we discuss the theories' testable implications and the associated econometric evidence. Of the two, transaction cost economics has had more success both generating predictions and explaining contracting behavior. [fre] Parce qu'elles sont susceptibles d'influer sur les législations contractuelles, les politiques et les pratiques industrielles, il est important que les théories des contrats se basent, autant que possible, sur des travaux empiriques solides. Cet article fait un bilan de ces études en insistant plus particulièrement sur les contributions de la théorie de l'agence et de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Après une brève présentation de ces approches théoriques, nous discutons des propositions testables qu'elles génèrent et des résultats des travaux économétriques sur le sujet. Des deux, la théorie des coûts de transaction est celle qui a eu le plus de succès pour générer des propositions et expliquer les comportements contractuels.

Impact of Performance-Based Contracting on Product Reliability: An Empirical Analysis

“…A number of empirical studies have considered the issue of contract choice decisions by firms in different contexts (see, for example, Slade (1996) for an application in the oil industry and Crocker and Reynolds (1993) for an application to the Air Force engine procurement process). In these and other studies, endogeneity of contract choice has been regarded as a key econometric issue in testing contract design hypotheses (Masten and Saussier 2002). As our results will indicate, there is evidence that endogeneity of contract choice by a customer is present in our data as well.…”

Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of Producer–Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry

“…14 The specifications are defined as follows: If we assume standard properties of error terms in equations (1) to (3), ordinary least squares (OLS) will provide best linear unbiased estimates. However, as pointed out by Sykuta (2005) and Masten and Saussier (2002) in an analysis of recent empirical work in new institutional economics, we might encounter a number of challenges implying that standard OLS produces a regression that is a biased estimate of the true slope. In the case of contracts, there are three limitations in using OLS techniques:…”

“…Second, results may be biased due to over-presentation of longer-term agreements (see Masten andSaussier, 2002, andMaddala 1983). This can be taking account of when using maximum likelihood estimation techniques as done by Joskow (1987) and Crocker and Masten (1988).…”

Poder na formação do arranjo institucional do sistema agroindustrial citrícola paulista

“…Essas são as três estruturas de governança de WILLIAMSON (1985WILLIAMSON ( , 1991a A ECT encontra suporte empírico consistente. A relação entre investimentos em ativos específicos e uso de contratos ou integração vertical encontra evidências empíricas (MONTEVERDE;TEECE, 1982;MASTEN, 1984;JOSKOW, 1985;MASTEN;MEEHAN;SNYDER, 1991;LYONS, 1994), bem como a relação entre investimentos em ativos específicos e a duração de contratos (JOSKOW, 1987;MASTEN, 1988;LAZZARINI, 2005;MASTEN, 2009 KLEIN, 1995;MASTEN;SAUSSIER, 2000).…”

“…Assim, modelos econométricos com variável dependente limitada são os mais empregados, já que a escolha é discreta entre alternativas de modos organizacionais. Esta hipótese foi amplamente testada em investigações empíricas, obtendo suporte incontroverso (MASTEN, 1993;SHELANSKI;KLEIN, 1995;MASTEN;SAUSSIER, 2000).…”