Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Électricité de France

Saussier, Stéphane

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00085-8

Cited by 178 publications

(113 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…15 Similarly, Mine Dedicated Assets is the ratio of an individual contract quantity to the sum of the mine's contract quantity. Larger levels of dedicated assets imply more appropriable quasi-rent at stake in the transaction, which will lead to a less flexible contract [25]. Thus, larger levels of dedicated assets are expected to lead to increases in the probability of explicit renegotiation when faced with a policy shock.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract renegotiation and rent re-distribution: Who gets raked over the coals?

Kosnik

Lange

2011

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Policy shocks affect the rent distribution in long-term contracts, which can lead to such contracts being renegotiated. We seek an understanding of what aspects of contract design, in the face of a substantial policy shock, affect the propensity to renegotiate. We test our hypotheses using data on U.S. coal contracts after the policy shock of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Contracts are divided into two categories, those that were renegotiated following the shock and those that were not. Characteristics of the contract are used to explain whether or not the contract was ultimately renegotiated. Results provide guidance on rent re-distribution and contract renegotiation more generally and are applicable to contemporary policy issues such as climate change legislation.JEL Codes: L51, Q48, D23, K32

show abstract

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract renegotiation and rent re-distribution: Who gets raked over the coals?

Kosnik

Lange

2011

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Related to endogeneity problems discussed in greater detail in the previous section, firms' decisions to invest in relationship-specific assets and to determine the amount invested are endogenous decisions (Masten & Saussier, 2002;Riordan & Williamson, 1985). Only a handful of recent papers such as Lyon (1995) and Saussier (2000) correct for this endogeneity problem.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing Organizational Economics Theories of Vertical Integration

Lajili¹,

Madunic²,

Mahoney³

Research Methodology in Strategy and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article classifies empirical research on vertical integration under four approaches -value-added-to-sales, qualitative-quantitative, input-output, and microanalytic. The emphasis here is on the microanalytic approach which has accumulated the most systematic evidence to support its theoretical propositions. In particular, this article emphasizes theoretical and empirical contributions from organizational economics (especially transaction costs and agency theories) for both vertical integration and (vertical) contracting. Limitations and methodological challenges concerning the empirical testing of theories of vertical integration are addressed and suggestions for further research are provided.

show abstract

“…An incomplete contract may be perceived as something negative. However, this may be an outcome of the desires of the parties involved as they want to reduce their transaction costs (Saussier 2000). Earlier Crocker and Reynolds (1993) have have analyzed 45 airplane engine purchasing contracts to prove that degree of contract completeness is endogenous to the relationship and also asserted that the degree of contractual completeness is a reflection of the will to minimize economic costs regarding with contractual exchange which makes it clearer that there is a trade-off between completeness and cost.…”

Section: Determinants Of Growth In Franchising Contracts In Emerging mentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Growth in Franchising Contracts in Emerging Markets; Evidences From Turkey

Sönmezer

Akman

2012

emaj

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study aims to examine the franchise sector and determine the significant factors that contribute to an increase in the number of franchiser's contracts in Turkey. Secondary data is used from the Turkish Franchise Association and multivariate regression models are run for each sector. Our models explain the change in the number of franchise contracts with R 2 's varying between .6577 and .7549. We provide evidence that success factors in increasing the number of contracts change depending on the sector firms operating in and contracts may be designed thusly to pursue success.

show abstract

Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Électricité de France

Cited by 178 publications

References 20 publications

Contract renegotiation and rent re-distribution: Who gets raked over the coals?

Contract renegotiation and rent re-distribution: Who gets raked over the coals?

Testing Organizational Economics Theories of Vertical Integration

Determinants of Growth in Franchising Contracts in Emerging Markets; Evidences From Turkey

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About