Auction procedures and competition in public services: The case of urban public transport in France and London

Amaral, Miguel; Saussier, Stéphane; Yvrande-Billon, Anne

doi:10.1016/j.jup.2008.07.006

Cited by 87 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The UK auctions (in London) were small and highly transparent, while the French auctions were bigger and less transparent [10]. Operating costs ended up being a lot lower in London, although costs started out at the same level.…”

Section: Public Transportationmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Public-sector outsourcing

Poutvaara¹

2014

IZAWOL

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Section: Public Transportationmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…An important mechanism to open the sector to competition is competitive tendering through auctioning. The idea is to "replace competition in the field by competition for the field" [10]. The higher the number of bidders, the more aggressively they should bid and the lower the final prices should be.…”

Section: Public Transportationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public-sector outsourcing

Poutvaara¹

2014

IZAWOL

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“…Sources : Merk, et al, 2012;OECD, 2007aOECD, , 2008aOECD/ITF, 2008b;Amaral et al, 2008;ADB and World Bank, 2006. …”

Section: Box 7 Principles For Transparent and Competitive Pppsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…by establishing independent regulatory regimes to encourage private providers to invest sufficiently in service provision and guarantee the fairness of user fees) (Meakin, 2004;Zegras, 2002). Experiences with introducing competition in tenders include the London model of urban public transport, which uses the transparency of auction procedures and the discretionary authority of the regulator to foster competition and avoid anticompetitive practices (Amaral et al, 2008).…”

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confidence: 99%

Mobilising Private Investment in Sustainable Transport

2013

OECD Environment Working Papers

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“…The importance of the design of awarding procedures is also emphasized by Amaral et al (2009) who argue that the French procedures are conducive to both corruption and collusion. The latter is supported by the fact that the big three operators were fined for collusive behavior in 2005.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Procurement Design: Evidence from Regional Passenger Railway Services in Germany

Hunold

Wolf

2013

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-technical summaryA major reform of the German regional passenger railway services was established with the so called Regionalisierungsgesetz in 1996. As a consequence, regional passenger railway services have been procured by regional public agencies from railway companies since then. A central goal of this reform was the establishment of a competitive transport market. In this article we study the competitive awarding procedures of the years since the reform by means of a new data set. The procurement agencies design the awarding procedures in different manners such that the question arises which design yields better awarding results. Among others, the design includes the contract duration as well as the revenue risk sharing between agency and operator. We investigate how the design parameters influence how many railway companies participate in a tender, which of them wins the contract and which price the agency has to pay.Our results indicate that more companies participate in an awarding procedure when the contract duration is long and when the company's revenue risks are low. The market leader DB Regio is more likely to win contracts when it already served the awarded lines in the past and when the line network is long. Moreover, DB Regio is more likely to win contracts with a long runtime, when used vehicles are allowed and when fewer competitors participate in the awarding procedure. Concerning the resulting payments of the agencies our only robust finding is that the agencies have to pay less if they do not receive the ticket revenue realized by the railway companies.In the following years a large fraction of the regional passenger railway network is to be procured. Our results can be applied in order to enhance the performance of the upcoming awarding procedures. Das Wichtigste in KürzeMit dem Inkrafttreten des Regionalisierungsgesetzes im Jahre 1996 wurde der Schienenpersonenverkehr in Deutschland grundlegend reformiert. Seitdem werden Schienenpersonennahverkehre von regionalen Aufgabenträgern bei Verkehrsunternehmen bestellt. Ein zentrales Ziel der Reform war die Schaffung eines wettbewerblich organisierten Verkehrsmarktes unter Berück-sichtigung der Daseinsvorsorge.In diesem Artikel studieren wir anhand eines neuen Datensatzes die wettbewerblichen Vergabeverfahren der seit der Reform vergangenen Jahre. Diese werden von den verschiedenen Aufgabenträgern unterschiedlich gestaltet, weshalb sich die Frage stellt, welche Gestaltungsparameter, dazu gehö...

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Auction procedures and competition in public services: The case of urban public transport in France and London

Cited by 87 publications

References 29 publications

Public-sector outsourcing

Public-sector outsourcing

Mobilising Private Investment in Sustainable Transport

Competitive Procurement Design: Evidence from Regional Passenger Railway Services in Germany

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