n 1957, Leon Festinger put forth the theory of cognitive dissonance I (Festinger, 1957b). His book described research and proposed a theory that explained the experimental results presented. It also contained a metatheory that borrowed from the zeitgeist of the period and incited Festinger to make various generalizations, including one that made a connection between his theory and cognitive-consistency theories. In fact, extracted from the metatheory, the central element of Festinger's theory boils down to this: A person can experience an unpleasant state of arousal (state of dissonance) that can be quantified by a ratio (the dissonance ratio; see chapter 2, this volume, for further explanation) and is reduced when this ratio decreases. Cognitions are relevant and taken into consideration only to the degree that they allow for composing this ratio. Further, in 1962, Brehm and Cohen stated that everything nontrivial that this theory offers relates to the dissonance ratio. When we speak below of the "theory of '57," we are referring to this central element of Festinger's presentation.After functioning on this basis for about 10 years and producing the experimental results and classical paradigms that made its reputation, the theory was revised. These revisions consisted of the introduction of new propositions (assumptions?) that were supposed to explain 43

La soumission librement consentie http://oqypdf.ecuriesdumesnildavid.fr/la-soumission-librement-consentie-jean-leon-71543791.pdf La soumission librement consentie Jean-Léon Beauvois Amener quelqu'un à faire en toute liberté ce qu'il doit faire est finalement moins Du piège abscons à la soumission librement consentie

How can people be induced to willingly change their behavior? The present article has three main objectives. Its first purpose is to review some of the procedures pertaining to the ‘free will’ compliance paradigm. These procedures increase the likelihood that others will freely comply to one's requests (low‐ball, teasing, foot‐in‐the door, touch, and ‘you are free to’ procedures). The second objective is to introduce a theory stemming from social psychology, namely, the theory of commitment. Finally, we wish to describe the binding communication approach that can be situated at the intersection of research conducted in both the fields of communication, more specifically in the domain of persuasive communication, and the fields of commitment and free will compliance. A project carried out to encourage school children to behave in a more environmentally friendly way will be described to illustrate the approach.

Eliciting sincere preferences for non-market goods remains a challenge due to the discrepency between hypothetical and real behavior and false zeros. The gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate real commitments or a combination of both. Herein we examine whether the traditional real-world institution of the solemn oath can improve preference elicitation. Applying the social psychology theory on the oath as a truth-telling-commitment device, we ask our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive-compatible second-price auction. The oath is an ancillary mechanism to commit bidders to bid sincerely in a second-price auction. Results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest the oath-only auctions outperform all our other auctions (real and hypothetical). In our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection, the oath-only design induced people to treat as binding both their experimental budget constraint (i.e., lower values on the high end of the value distribution) and participation constraint (i.e., positive values in place of the zero bids used to opt-out of auction). Based on companion treatments, we show the oath works through an increase in the willingness to tell the truth, due to a strengthening of the intrinsic motivation to do so.

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