A radical point of view on dissonance theory.

Abstract

n 1957, Leon Festinger put forth the theory of cognitive dissonance I (Festinger, 1957b). His book described research and proposed a theory that explained the experimental results presented. It also contained a metatheory that borrowed from the zeitgeist of the period and incited Festinger to make various generalizations, including one that made a connection between his theory and cognitive-consistency theories. In fact, extracted from the metatheory, the central element of Festinger's theory boils down to this: A person can experience an unpleasant state of arousal (state of dissonance) that can be quantified by a ratio (the dissonance ratio; see chapter 2, this volume, for further explanation) and is reduced when this ratio decreases. Cognitions are relevant and taken into consideration only to the degree that they allow for composing this ratio. Further, in 1962, Brehm and Cohen stated that everything nontrivial that this theory offers relates to the dissonance ratio. When we speak below of the "theory of '57," we are referring to this central element of Festinger's presentation.After functioning on this basis for about 10 years and producing the experimental results and classical paradigms that made its reputation, the theory was revised. These revisions consisted of the introduction of new propositions (assumptions?) that were supposed to explain 43

Cognitive Dissonance Theory After 50 Years of Development

“…That is, it is the inconsistency between important action tendencies that causes dissonance. This line of thinking is consistent with the thinking of past dissonance theorists who emphasized behavior as the focal or generative cognition (Brehm & Cohen, 1962;Beauvois & Joule, 1996Mills, 1999;Wicklund & Frey, 1981). The action-based model extends these past views by suggesting that the other (non-generative) cognitions most likely to arouse dissonance are those that have action tendencies inconsistent with the generative cognition.…”

“…However, as several subsequent theorists noted, dissonance theory contained an important element not present in other consistency theories (Brehm & Cohen, 1962;Wicklund & Frey, 1981). That is, dissonant and consonant cognitions are defined in relation to a particular focal or generative cognition (Beauvois & Joule, 1996Mills, 1999). Moreover, this focal cognition is usually related to a behavior, a point to which we return later.…”

“…The women in the severe initiation condition evaluated the group more favorably than the women in the mild initiation condition. This paradigm continues to be used fruitfully in research (e.g., Beauvois & Joule, 1996), and it has been usefully applied in psychotherapy (e.g., Axsom & Cooper, 1985;Draycott & Dabbs, 1998).…”

“…Experiments have shown that when individuals engage in such behavior, they often change their attitudes to be consistent with their recent behavior. After making difficult decisions, individuals value the chosen alternative and devalue the rejected alternative more than they did prior to the decision (for reviews, see Beauvois & Joule, 1996;Brehm & Cohen, 1962;Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). In both of these dissonance-evoking situations, dissonance occurs because there are cognitions that are inconsistent with a chosen course of action.…”

When communications collide with recipients' actions: Effects of post-message behavior on intentions to follow the message recommendation

“…Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957;Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959;Wicklund & Brehm, 1976; see also Beauvois & Joule, 1999) implies that people who become aware that they have voluntarily performed a behavior that contradicts the implications of a persuasive message may experience arousal and rationalize their behavior. Thus, the stronger the original recommendation against the behavior, the better the case (or the rationalization) a person must develop in support of the behavior to restore cognitive consistency.…”