Rev. Adm. Pública -Rio de Janeiro 49(1): 47-71, jan./fev. 2015 48 Paulo Augusto P. de Britto • et. al. a evolução e a organização atual do setor portuário brasileiro. Ao longo da discussão, exemplos de portos são apresentados para ilustrar os conceitos apresentados.Pal av r a s -c h av e : setor portuário; reforma portuária; participação privada nos portos; concorrência no setor portuário; Lei dos Portos.Promoción de la competencia en el sector portuario: un análisis de los modelos globales y aplicación al caso de Brasil El crecimiento de la demanda de servicios en los sectores de infraestructura, junto con la falta de inversión pública, condujo políticas de promoción de la participación privada. En el sector portuario la participación privada recibió impulso a principios de 1990, cuando el crecimiento del comercio internacional y creciente globalización ha puesto de manifiesto la ineficacia general de este sector. Este artículo tiene como objetivo discutir la participación privada en el sector portuario desde el análisis de las formas de organización en esto sector en los distintos países y los modelos de competencia asociados a las diferentes estructuras de propiedad en las zonas del puerto. El artículo innova en relación con la literatura mediante la propuesta de la propiedad privada de zonas de uso restringido en el puerto. El artículo también presenta la evolución y organización actual del sector portuario brasileño. A lo largo de la discusión, los ejemplos se presentan para ilustrar los conceptos presentados.Pal a b r a s c l av e : sector portuario; reforma del puerto; participación privada en los puertos; competencia en el sector portuario; Ley de los puertos.Promoting competition in the port sector: an analysis from the global models and application to the Brazilian case The growth in demand for services in the infrastructure sectors, coupled with the lack of public investment, led to policies to promote private participation in those sectors. In the port sector, the private participation started in the early 90s, when the growth of international trade resulted from increasing globalization has highlighted the generalized inefficiency of this sector. This article aims to discuss the private participation in the port sector from the analysis of ways of organization, as well as the evolution of this sector in different countries, analyzing the possible competition models associated to different ownership structures in the areas of the port. The article also presents the evolution and the current organization of the Brazilian port model. Throughout the discussion, examples of ports are presented to illustrate the discussed concepts.
Takotsubo cardiomyopathy (TC) is an acute cardiac dysfunction, clinically similar to myocardial ischemia. The physiopathology of the syndrome seems to be related to excessive sympathetic activity that is triggered by physical or emotional stress factors. We report the case of an 83-year-old woman with advanced Alzheimer disease who had recently used nortriptyline and sertraline and was admitted with chest pain. An electrocardiogram showed ST-elevation, and markers of myocardial necrosis were slightly increased. However, coronariography did not demonstrate stenotic lesions. Transthoracic echocardiography and ventriculography identified decreased ventricular function, apical akinesia, and compensatory hyperkinesia of other segments that were compatible with TC. The patient evolved with cardiogenic shock and died. Alzheimer patients may be more susceptible to develop TC, both because of the disease itself and because of the multiple medications they are exposed to that increase catecholamine levels. In this case, antidepressant drugs were considered to be a potential factor that enhanced the susceptibility.
Summary: 1. Introduction; 2. The duopoly policy in the BMTR; 3. Revisiting the main theoretical arguments in favor of limiting entry; 4. A theoretical model for understanding the trade-offs among competition, scale economies and privatization revenues; 5. Lessons from the international experience and conclusions.Keywords: privatization; telecommunications; duopoly policy. JEL codes: L33; L43; L96.One of the important characteristics of the Brazilian Model of Telecommunications Reform (BMTR) was the adoption of a duopoly policy, constraining the entry of new players in the wire segment in the transitional phase until free competition in 2002. This policy was also used in the reform experience of the United Kingdom in telecommunications in the 80´s. The theoretical explanations behind this kind of policy are not strong enough to justify the duopoly policy in telecommunications. The most plausible idea rests on the prominent role conferred to privatization revenues in the design of the reform as a means of helping the efforts to consolidate price stabilization in the country. We introduce a model with the trade-offs between competition, duplication of fixed costs and privatization revenues. Despite the importance of fixed costs in the objective function of the regulator, we show that the privatization revenue target is the aspect, which justifies the imposition of entry constraints. The British experience shows that the sacrifice of this kind of policy regarding efficiency in the long run can be substantial. Uma das características mais importantes do Modelo Brasileiro de Reforma das Telecomunicações foi a adoção de uma política de duopólio, restringindo a entrada de novas empresas no segmento de telefonia fixa durante a fase de transição até a livre concorrência a ser adotada a partir de 2002. Essa política foi também utilizada na experiência de reforma das telecomunicações ocorrida no Reino Unido na década de 80. As explicações teóricas para justificar a adoção deste tipo de política não são satisfatórias o suficiente para justificar a política de duopólio como prescrição de política nas telecomunicações. A idéia mais plausível se baseia no papel proeminente conferidoàs receitas de privatização no desenho da reforma como forma de auxiliar os esforços de consolidação da estabilização de preços no País. Introduzimos um modelo que apresenta os trade-offs entre concorrência, duplicação de custos fixos e receitas de privatização. A despeito da importância dos custos fixos na função objetivo do regulador, mostramos que a meta de aumentar as receitas esperadas de privatizaçãoé o aspecto que acaba por justificar a imposição das restrições de entrada. A experiência britânica mostra que o sacrifício deste tipo de política no que tangè a eficiência no longo prazo pode ser substantiva.
In this note we show that the conditions that guarantee uniqueness and optimality of Walrasian equilibrium under uncertainty are not sufficient to guarantee these results for non-noisy rational expectations equilibrium under asymmetric information.Investigating the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibrium (R.E.E.) under asymmetric information, Grossman (1981) has established that as long as there are complete markets and consumers have additively separable non-satiable strictly concave differentiable utility functions, there exists some R.E.E. which cannot be Pareto dominated by a fully informed planner (i.e. Pareto dominated in the ex post sense).In this note we want to present the complement of these results. Namely, there are economies satisfying the above mentioned conditions (in fact satisfying conditions that guarantee uniqueness of Walrasian equilibrium) such that: (i) there exists a R.E.E. which does not aggregate information perfectly; and (ii) there exists a R.E.E. that can be ex post Pareto dominated.To exhibit our first "bad" R.E.E., consider a one good pure exchange economy with two periods: today and tomorrow. Tomorrow's state of nature is a random variable s which can assume two values, denoted 51 and 52' Today's endowments, consumption and state of nature are previously determined and play no role in resource allocation. There are two consumers with identical (and state independent) preferences over tomorrow's consumption, which can be described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The endowments of tomorrow's goods for consumers 1 and 2 are, respectively, e l = (e~= 0, ei= 1) and e2 = (e~= 1, e~= 0), where e~represents the endowment of consumer h of good J.
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