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When road segments with high traffic stress are excluded, the remaining network of low-stress roads and trails can be fragmented, lacking connections between many origin-destination pairs or requiring onerous detour. Low-stress connectivity is a measure of the degree to which origins (for this study, homes) and destinations (jobs) can be connected using only low-stress links and without excessive detour. Revision 2.0 to Level of Traffic Stress criteria is introduced and applied to the road and trail network of northern Delaware. A propensity model is proposed to reflect people’s declining willingness to ride a bike with greater trip length and detour, accounting for the impact to health and other benefits of cycling. New connectivity measures are introduced that can be interpreted as the number of bike-accessible jobs and the potential number of bike-to-work trips, powerful measures for evaluating alternatives. These connectivity measures are applied in a case study evaluating alternative alignments for a bike route between Wilmington and Newark, Delaware’s two largest cities, separated by a distance of about 20 km through a largely suburban landscape. The case study explores the benefits of enhancing alternatives with branches that help connect to population and employment centers. We also find that the connectivity gain from constructing multiple alignments is greater than the sum of connectivity gains from individual alignments, indicating that complementarity between the alternatives, which are spaced roughly 5 km apart, overshadows any competition between them.

What role should statistical probability, based on a predictable distribution of outcomes in a hypothesized long run of trials, play in a decisionsituation involving an individual case? Does a statistical interpretation of probability require one, in rational decision-making, to decide in an isolated individual case just as one would in a rational decision-situation involving many repetitions of the individual case? Often one will do in an isolated individual case what one would do in a long run of repetitions of such a case. For example, given the option to bet (with the same odds) either that a toss of a die will not be a 6 or that it will be a 6, one ought to bet that it will not be a 6; for the probability of getting not-6 is five times the probability of getting 6. According to a statistical interpretation of probability, this means that in a suitable long run, not-6 would result (approximately) five times as often as 6. In such a long run, one ought to bet every time on not-6, as this would quintuple one's number of wins as compared to betting on 6.A statistical interpretation of probability judgments regarding an isolated individual case (a case that is not part of a statistically relevant long run) suggests the following: The rationally preferable strategy of one's betting only on not-6 in a long run is suficient for the rational preferability of one's betting on not-6 in an isolated individual case. Is this true universally? Is it, alternatively, ever rationally permissible to do in an isolated individual case what would not be rationally preferable in a suitable long run of cases (that is, the kind of long run constitutive of statistical probability judgments)? This paper examines these 109 Downloaded by [McMaster University] at

Many people are perplexed, even troubled, by the fact that God (if such there be) has not made His existence sufficiently clear. This fact-the fact of divine hiddenness-is a source of existential concern for many people. That is, it raises problems about their very existence, particularly its value and purpose. The fact of divine hiddenness is also, according to some people, a source of good evidence against the existence of God. That is, it allegedly poses a cognitive problem for theism, in the form of evidence challenging the assumption that God exists. (Here and throughout we speak of "God" as broadly represented in the historic Jewish and Christian theistic traditions.

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