Empirical Justification

Moser, Paul K.

doi:10.1007/978-94-009-4526-5

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…In epistemology, there are two theories of belief: fundamental theory and coherence theory. Fundamental theory (Alston & Alston, 1993;Moser, 1991Moser, , 2012Swain, 1979) argues that there is a fundamental set of belief units in the brain, which is formed by a direct, nondeductive manner, a set on which other beliefs are developed. Coherence theory (Bonjour, 1985;Harman, 1986) holds that beliefs are formed in the process of logic or reasoning and that beliefs depend on other beliefs and the degree of coherence that supports them.…”

Section: The Generation Of Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological model of representation, generation, and adjustion of belief for artificial general intelligence

Kai

2021

Human Behav and Emerg Tech

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In order for strong artificial intelligence to generate human-like belief, there must be an operational definition and a representation consistent with computer simulation. This article reviewed the research findings and theories on representation, generation, and adjustion of belief, and proposed a new three-dimensional network psychological model of belief representation. Belief is represented in two forms, belief sentence and belief structure diagram, and consists of four key elements, which are belief content, belief value, grammar, and link. Based on this belief representation, this article expounded how belief generates and changes, and a possible abstract model for simulation by artificial general intelligence.

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Section: The Generation Of Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological model of representation, generation, and adjustion of belief for artificial general intelligence

Kai

2021

Human Behav and Emerg Tech

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“…My favorite example of the overlooking of such a possibility occurs in the recent volume Contemporary Debates in Hall and Charles Johnson (1998), Allan Hazlett (2006, n.d.), Hilary Kornblith (1985Kornblith ( , 1993Kornblith ( , 2002, Jonathan Kvanvig (2003Kvanvig ( , 2005Kvanvig ( , 2011, Keith Lehrer (1977Lehrer ( , 1981Lehrer ( , 1988, Jarrett Leplin (2007), Michael Lynch (2004, 2009a, 2009b, Stephen Maitzen (1995), Nenad Miscevic (2007), James Montmarquet (1987Montmarquet ( , 1993Montmarquet ( , 2008, Philip Percival (2002), Alvin Plantinga (1988, 1993a, 1993b, Steven Reynolds (2002), Wayne Riggs (2003), Darrell Rowbottom (2008), Frederick Schmitt (1992, Tomoji Shogenji (2012aShogenji ( , 2012b, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2009, Hamid Vahid (2006, 2010), Ralph Wedgwood (2002, Jonathan Weinberg (2007), Dennis Whitcomb (2007Whitcomb ( , 2011, and at least certain time-slices of Paul Moser (1985) and Ernest Sosa (1991).…”

Section: The Pervasiveness Of Teleology In Contemporary Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions

Berker

2013

The Philosophical Review

131

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Abstract:When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is: "Yes, we should." In this essay I argue to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, I argue, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible tradeoffs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value-and, by extension, epistemic goals-are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest.

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“…Perhaps the clearest examples are Feldman and Conee (1985). But evidentialist sympathies can also be discerned in the writings of Chisholm (1977), Moser (1985, 1989), Fumerton (1995), Haack (1993, 1997), and Russell (2001).…”

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confidence: 97%

“…1 1 This objection to reliabilism is proposed by Cohen (1984, 280–82), Foley (1985, ), Lehrer (1990, 166) and Moser (1985, 240–241). …”

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confidence: 98%