In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive externalities — the merger of coalitions increases the payoffs of players who belong to other coalitions. A key result is that, apart from the case of two players, the grand coalition is not a Nash equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, in the case of three or more players the only Nash equilibrium coalition structure is the one formed by singletons. The results indicate that the prospects of cooperation in straddling stock fisheries are low if players can free ride cooperative agreements. Thus, in order to protect cooperation, under the aegis of regional fishery management organizations, unregulated fishing must be prevented.
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency. JEL References: C72; Q22.Keywords: straddling fish stock, regional fisheries management organizations, unregulated fishing, bioeconomic model, coalition formation model, free-riding. 1 IntroductionThe 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN, 1982) brought forth the regime of 200 nautical miles coastal state Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which revolutionized the management of world capture fisheries. However, an important aspect was not effectively addressed by the 1982 UN Convention, namely the management of fisheries resources to be found both within the coastal state EEZ and the adjacent high seas, where the resources are subject to exploitation by so called distant water fishing states. These fishery resources are commonly referred to as straddling fish stocks 2 .Such fish stocks, which account for about 20 per cent of the worlds capture fishery harvests (Munro et al. 2004), were subject to heavy overexploitation in the decade following the advent of the 1982 UN Convention. This led to further action by the UN in the first half of the 1990s, resulting in a supplement to the 1982 UN Convention in the form of an international agreement, popularly known as the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UN, 1995 Since membership in RFMOs is voluntary, straddling fish stocks can be regarded as common pool resources shared between RFMOs' members and non-members. Thus, the level of participation and the stability of these organizations in effectively mitigating overfishing are key issues on the management of straddling fish stocks. These issues have mainly been addressed using game theory. For instance, Kaitala and Munro (1997), based on the classical dynamic fisheries bioeconomic model (Clark and Munro, 1975), study the threat to cooperative agreements posed by prospective new members by comparing the charter members' payoffs under a cooperative solution and under complete non-cooperation. Hannesson (1997) and Tarui et al. (2008) analyze the prospects of achieving full cooperation through threat of punishments using dynamic games. Empirical studies on the prospects of cooperative agreements have also been undertaken, e.g. by Kennedy (2003) and Lindroos (2004).Recently, the partition function approach has been applied to study coalition formation in fisheries (e.g. Pintassilgo, 2003, andPham Do andFolmer, 200...
In the current paper we examine a game‐theoretic setting in which three countries have established a regional organization for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation. We demonstrate that the nucleolus and the Shapley value give more of the benefits to the coalition with substantial bargaining power than does the Nash bargaining scheme. We also compare the results that are obtained by using the nucleolus and the Shapley value as solution concepts. The outcomes from these solution concepts depend on the relative efficiency of the most efficient coalition. Furthermore, the question of fair sharing of the benefits is considered in the context of straddling stocks.
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency. JEL References: C72; Q22.Keywords: straddling fish stock, regional fisheries management organizations, unregulated fishing, bioeconomic model, coalition formation model, free-riding. 1 IntroductionThe 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN, 1982) brought forth the regime of 200 nautical miles coastal state Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which revolutionized the management of world capture fisheries. However, an important aspect was not effectively addressed by the 1982 UN Convention, namely the management of fisheries resources to be found both within the coastal state EEZ and the adjacent high seas, where the resources are subject to exploitation by so called distant water fishing states. These fishery resources are commonly referred to as straddling fish stocks 2 .Such fish stocks, which account for about 20 per cent of the worlds capture fishery harvests (Munro et al. 2004), were subject to heavy overexploitation in the decade following the advent of the 1982 UN Convention. This led to further action by the UN in the first half of the 1990s, resulting in a supplement to the 1982 UN Convention in the form of an international agreement, popularly known as the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UN, 1995 Since membership in RFMOs is voluntary, straddling fish stocks can be regarded as common pool resources shared between RFMOs' members and non-members. Thus, the level of participation and the stability of these organizations in effectively mitigating overfishing are key issues on the management of straddling fish stocks. These issues have mainly been addressed using game theory. For instance, Kaitala and Munro (1997), based on the classical dynamic fisheries bioeconomic model (Clark and Munro, 1975), study the threat to cooperative agreements posed by prospective new members by comparing the charter members' payoffs under a cooperative solution and under complete non-cooperation. Hannesson (1997) and Tarui et al. (2008) analyze the prospects of achieving full cooperation through threat of punishments using dynamic games. Empirical studies on the prospects of cooperative agreements have also been undertaken, e.g. by Kennedy (2003) and Lindroos (2004).Recently, the partition function approach has been applied to study coalition formation in fisheries (e.g. Pintassilgo, 2003, andPham Do andFolmer, 200...
The paper studies cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule which takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. The paper contributes to the literature by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). For an illustrative example it sets up a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model among the major agents exploiting the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.
Environmental standards have rarely been applied for promoting the joint production of hydropower and migratory fish. The objective of this study was to review existing research results on the effectiveness and costs of alternative measures improving fish migration, which are necessary for the development of environmental standards. The ranking of alternative measures indicates that cost-effective combinations of measures are case-specific and highly dependent on measure design, implementation and maintenance. In addition to tailored ex ante cost-effectiveness analyses, other preconditions for cost savings include effective and affordable monitoring and enforcement, and cooperation among power companies that share water-use rights within a river basin as well as among other stakeholders, such as the local community, fishermen and recreational users.
We evaluated the association between patellofemoral relationships and cartilage lesions in patients (age range 15-49) with anterior knee pain without patellar dislocation (n = 24) and in patients with isolated meniscal rupture without a high energy trauma (n = 21). The position of the patella was assessed from knee radiographs, and cartilage lesion was graded and mapped at arthroscopy. In subjects with lateral patellar cartilage lesion the patella tilted laterally (p < 0.01) and was clearly laterally displaced (p < 0.001), compared to those without patellar cartilage lesion. In subjects with central patellar cartilage lesion the patella located high according to the Insall-Salvati index (p < 0.01) and was somewhat laterally displaced (p < 0.05). Compared to subjects without cartilage lesion in the femoral trochlea, the patella was laterally displaced in subjects with lesion in the lateral trochlea (p < 0.001). In conclusion, our results suggest that specific malalignments predispose to patellofemoral cartilage lesion, but prospective studies are needed to confirm the finding.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.