Sharing the Benefits of Cooperation in High Seas Fisheries: A Characteristic Function Game Approach

Kaitala, Veijo; Lindroos, Marko

doi:10.1111/j.1939-7445.1998.tb00312.x

Cited by 50 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…As well as testing whether the coalition including all players (grand coalition) is stable (in the sense of the core, for example), the main focus is on the axiomatic foundation of normatively motivated sharing schemes such as the Nash bargaining solution, the Shapley value and the Chander-Tulkens´ transfer scheme. Applications are found in the context of global warming Tulkens, 1995, 1997;Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003;Germain et al, 1998), acid rain (Germain et al, 1996;Kaitala et al, 1995), high seas fisheries (Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998;Lindroos, 2004;Lindroos andKaitala, 2001, Pintassilgo, 2003) and water management (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002;Lejano and Davos, 1999). This approach may be regarded as the classical cooperative method of studying coalitions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

2005

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

2005

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“…The theory of games provides an approach to dealing with the complex issue of management of stocks shared between two or more groups of participants (Kaitala & Lindroos 1998). This body of theory predicts that fisheries exploited by two or more independent national fleets with inadequate exchange of information are liable to overexploitation (Kairala & Munro 1993Munro 2002).…”

Section: Applications Of Game Theory To Resource Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

This is more difficult than we thought! The responsibility of scientists, managers and stakeholders to mitigate the unsustainability of marine fisheries

Caddy

Seijo

2005

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

100

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This is more difficult than we thought! The responsibility of scientists, managers and stakeholders to mitigate the unsustainability of marine fisheries The management of marine fisheries needs to undergo dramatic change in the new millennium, in response to the well-documented evidence of global overfishing and the general depletion of commercial fish stocks. The axioms of sustainable development and equilibrium productivity of wild ecosystems are identified as misleading concepts, which nonetheless underlie current approaches to the management of living marine resources. Current trends in marine fisheries landings worldwide provide little evidence of sustainability of marine resources under current management paradigms, where biological, economic and social aspects of fisheries are usually treated as different disciplines. While open-access conditions are less widespread than formerly, except for many straddling and highly migratory resources, fishers usually have access to the resource year-round throughout its range. Despite quotas, the nominal control of capacity and technical measures protecting juveniles, top-down management has generally been unable to prevent stock depletion, particularly of the older spawners that for demersal stocks often support recruitment. An integrated solution to the complexity of managing wild resources seems not to have been achieved. Any new paradigm should assert the basic unpredictability of fisheries at the system level and require a broader range of performance indicators to be incorporated into the decisional framework. This must reflect the non-equilibrium nature of marine systems, and give greater importance to resource (as opposed to harvest) continuity in the face of regime shifts, and promote habitat restoration and conservation of genetic resources.The new management framework requires co-management and collective decision-making to be incorporated within a precautionary and pre-negotiated management framework. This must explicitly recognize that decision-making occurs in conditions of model-based uncertainty and precautionary approaches should be incorporated at all levels, not least of which is to avoid the assumption that all resources can be harvested in a sustainable fashion through time. Redundancy in data inputs to management are needed to avoid the surprises that model-based sampling occasionally leads to, for example, when regime changes reduce productivity in response to climatic fluctuations. Emergency frameworks imposing non-discretionary rules must be invoked when overfishing and/or regime change trigger reference points indicating stock depletion. Non-discretionary recovery plans should then override rights-based systems and persist until fish populations recover to pre-established healthy levels, which may in turn need to await the return of a favourable regime.In fact, some stocks may require periodic rebuilding after regime-induced collapses or because of a combination of ecological or economic impacts, hence a constant harvest policy may not always...

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“…Our reasoning and model differ from coalition formation in high-seas fisheries as modelled by Kaitala and Lindroos (1998). In their paper it is simply assumed that the coastal state fleet ex ante is more cost efficient than the distant water states fleets (see also Kaitala and Pohjola 1988;Pintassilgo 2003;Pintassilgo and Lindroos 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards

Johannesen¹,

Skonhoft²

2009

Land Economics

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ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the ''tragedy of the commons'' outcome. (JEL Q24)

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Sharing the Benefits of Cooperation in High Seas Fisheries: A Characteristic Function Game Approach

Cited by 50 publications

References 17 publications

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

This is more difficult than we thought! The responsibility of scientists, managers and stakeholders to mitigate the unsustainability of marine fisheries

Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards

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