2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.fishres.2009.11.003
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Application of game theory to fisheries over three decades

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Cited by 121 publications
(78 citation statements)
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“…Although the literature on straddling sh stocks is extensive, with several contributions in recent years, no study addresses these issues in a multispecies context (Bailey et al 2010;Hannesson 2011;Bjørndal and Munro 2012 We present a model of the Norwegian Sea pelagic complex that incorporates species interspeci c competition and a common carrying capacity while maintaining a low dimensionality. The model is nonlinear, non-convex, and stochastic.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the literature on straddling sh stocks is extensive, with several contributions in recent years, no study addresses these issues in a multispecies context (Bailey et al 2010;Hannesson 2011;Bjørndal and Munro 2012 We present a model of the Norwegian Sea pelagic complex that incorporates species interspeci c competition and a common carrying capacity while maintaining a low dimensionality. The model is nonlinear, non-convex, and stochastic.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Academic scholarship on international fisheries (and environmental) agreements suggest that (full) cooperation is ideal (Munro 2004, Bailey et al 2010, Hannesson 2011. Much of this literature, however, focuses on state-to-state cooperation and not on the myriad other 'private' or market actors that also cooperate to reach sustainability outcomes.…”
Section: Tuna Institutions Facing Dynamic Interestsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hilborn et al 2005, Young 2011) and game theory (e.g. Munro 2008, Bailey et al 2010, Hannesson 2011 argue that cooperation is ideal and can only be achieved when members have an incentive to comply and stay in the agreement. Thus the success of any regime depends on these incentives and the willingness of members to stay and comply.…”
Section: Compliance and Regime Effectivenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
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