Background and ObjectivesCovid-19 vaccines approved by the EU, UK and USA have been found to be safe and effective. The cost effectiveness of these vaccines depends upon a number of factors. The aim of this paper is to explore the cost effectiveness of a COVID-19 vaccine and to analyse how the price of the vaccine and the cost of administrating it influence its cost effectiveness. Methods We considered an epidemiological model developed by an expert group within 'Statens Serum Institut', which is a unit under the auspices of the Danish Ministry of Health. The model allowed us to differentiate between two population groups, those aged ≥60 years and those aged <60 years. We used the model to consider four scenarios: (i) vaccination of 25% of the total population (corresponding to approximately 1.5 million persons) but targeting vaccines towards the population aged ≥60 years, (ii) vaccination of 25% of the total population, targeting vaccines only towards the population aged <60 years, (iii) vaccination of 40% of the total population where 15% are aged <60 years and 25% are aged ≥60 years (corresponding approximately to the full Danish population aged >60 years), and (iv) 40% of the total population is vaccinated but vaccines are targeted solely towards those aged <60 years. The time horizon of the analysis was six months, and the perspective was that of the Danish healthcare sector. ResultsThe results show that inclusion of the elderly population aged ≥60 years was more cost effective than a vaccination strategy that targeted a population aged <60 years old only, when productivity losses were not included. Furthermore, the results show that an extension of the target group from the elderly population only, to also include the younger population comes with an increasing cost per life-year gained. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio depends on the price of the vaccine, hereunder also the administration costs, and the discount rate used for the estimation of life-years or quality-adjusted life-years gained from a vaccine. Furthermore, inclusion of productivity losses in the analyses influenced the cost effectiveness of vaccination of the population aged <60 years of age. ConclusionThe cost effectiveness of a COVID-19 vaccine is sensitive to whether or not productivity losses are included in the analyses. Without productivity losses, the elderly population should always be part of the target group for a COVID-19 vaccination programme. Taking productivity losses into account, at least in the case of low vaccine prices, vaccinating the younger population first can actually be cost effective.
The paper studies cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule which takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. The paper contributes to the literature by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). For an illustrative example it sets up a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model among the major agents exploiting the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities affects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less cooperation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among authorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort compared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery.The authors acknowledge valuable comments and suggestions from Frank Jensen and Niels Vestergaard.
We review the literature on coalition games applied in fisheries economics.We first indicate the importance and origin of the theory. Then we compare noncooperative and cooperative coalition game approaches. Our conclusion is that the non-cooperative and the cooperative approach should be linked together. To achieve this aim future research on stability of cooperative solutions and factors influencing stability is needed.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.