Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities

Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk; Lindroos, Marko

doi:10.1086/mre.22.2.42629549

Cited by 41 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Efficiency and stability metrics are commonly used to evaluate coalitions (e.g., [24,29,28,19]). The former giving an assurance on the economical gain reached by being in the coalition, the later giving a certainty that the coalition is viable on the long term.…”

Section: Selecting the Best Coalitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Computing Coalitions in Multiagent Systems: A Contextual Reasoning Approach

Bikakis¹,

Caire

2015

Multi-Agent Systems

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Abstract. In multiagent systems, agents often have to rely on other agents to reach their goals, for example when they lack a needed resource or do not have the capability to perform a required action. Agents therefore need to cooperate. Some of the questions then raised, such as, which agent to cooperate with, are addressed in the field of coalition formation. In this paper we go further and first, address the question of how to compute the solution space for the formation of coalitions using a contextual reasoning approach. We model agents as contexts in Multi-Context Systems (MCS) and dependence relations among agents as bridge rules. We then systematically compute all potential coalitions using algorithms for MCS equilibria. Finally, given a set of functional and non-functional requirements, we propose ways to select the best solutions. We illustrate our approach with an example from robotics.

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Section: Selecting the Best Coalitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, several elements come to play for the evaluation of a coalition's stability such as the characteristic function [23], Shapley value [29], nucleolus [28], Satisfactory Nucleolus [19] and others.…”

Section: Selecting the Best Coalitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computing Coalitions in Multiagent Systems: A Contextual Reasoning Approach

Bikakis¹,

Caire

2015

Multi-Agent Systems

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“…eq. (5a) and (5b) subject to the stocks being at equilibrium (5). Here p 1 is the market price of fish stock x 1 , p 2 the market price of fish stock x 2 and c is the unit cost of effort.…”

Section: Sole Owner Optimum W/ Two Speciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

Kronbak

Lindroos

2011

SBE

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative ExploitersLone Grønbaek Kronbak Marko Lindroos August 2008All rights reserved. No part of this WORKING PAPER may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the written permission of IME except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. AbstractGame-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. It is, however, the case that these types of models do not capture many real world mixed fisheries, where species are biological independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting biodiversity preservation by setting up a two species model with the aim of ensuring both species survive harvesting of exploiters adapting a noncooperative behaviour. The model starts out as a multi-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to include also biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the limits on the number of players preserving both species including the conditions to be satisfied. For visual purposes we simulate a two species model with different kind of interrelationship.

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“…Its application to fisheries agreements began in the late 1970s around the time when the 200 mile zone was recognised, establishing de facto property rights of coastal states over the fish in extended zones (Bailey et al 2010, Hannesson 2011. Game theory has been applied extensively to the issue of how such shared fish stocks will be exploited (Lindroos 2004, Kronbak 2007. Questions focus on how cooperation can be achieved given that countries differ, the outcomes of competition versus cooperation and what could be done to secure a cooperative outcome (Bailey et al 2010, Hannesson 2011.…”

Section: Game Theory -Coalition Theory and Principal Agent Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, coalition theory, one branch of game theory, analyses international environmental agreements on trans-boundary problems caused by externalities, such as migratory tuna stocks (Bailey et al 2010, Hannesson 2011. This research examines the extent to which cooperative arrangements succeed or fail to secure positive environmental outcomes (e.g Lindroos 2004, Kronbak 2007, Pintassilgo 2010, as well as the degree of stability of the cooperation in maintaining these outcomes over time (Dellink 2011).…”

Section: Game Theory -Coalition Theory and Principal Agent Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

New tuna regimes

Yeeting¹

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Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities

Cited by 41 publications

References 20 publications

Computing Coalitions in Multiagent Systems: A Contextual Reasoning Approach

Computing Coalitions in Multiagent Systems: A Contextual Reasoning Approach

On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

New tuna regimes

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