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Decision makers (''Judges'') often make decisions after obtaining advice from an Advisor. The two parties often share a psychological ''contract'' about what each contributes in expertise to the decision and receives in monetary outcomes from it. In a laboratory experiment, we varied Advisor Experitise and the opportunity for monetary rewards. As expected, these manipulations influenced advice quality, advice taking, and Judge post-advice decision quality. The main contribution of the study, however, was the manipulation of the timing of monetary rewards (before or after the advising interaction). We found, as predicted, that committing money for expert-but not novice-advice increases Judges' use of advice and their subsequent estimation accuracy. Implications for advice giving and taking are discussed.

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The present research examined the social context of information acquisition. The main purpose was to examine how decision-makers' information acquisition processes changed when they were provided access to expert advice. Results indicated that all decision-makers opted to acquire advice; however, they typically did so only after completing over 75% of their own information search. Decision-makers agreed more with the advice as task complexity increased, but, in general, searched information in two stages-i.e., a pre-advice ''hypothesis generation'' stage and a post-advice ''hypothesis testing'' stage. To behave in an adaptive manner, decision-makers could have used expert advice either to increase their decision accuracy or to reduce their effort expenditure (or both); they chose the former. Implications and further extensions are discussed.