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Six-person mock civil juries awarded significantly larger amounts for damages than did 12-person juries, and individuals preferred even larger average awards. A reversal of the "deep-pockets bias" observed earlier, an explanation involving temporal fluctuation in normative standards, during the time interval between the studies, was supported by independent data showing temporal trends in actual civil trial awards. A computational model of consensus that assumed a strong majority of those members with the most similar (closest) personal preferences decided on the median of their preferences accurately predicted award magnitude. Computer simulations explored the effects of critical faction size (majority, etc.) and location within the group, features that might in turn depend on task environment, cultural dynamics, and social context.

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Although citizen panels have become quite popular for policy making, there is very little research on how the procedures these groups employ to manage consensus affect their decision making. We measured the effect of a simple procedural mechanism, agenda order, on individual and group allocations for an HIV policy. Allocations made in a large-small (state-region-city) order were substantially smaller, overall, than were allocations made in small-large (city-region-state) order, and group allocations were smaller, overall, than were individual judgments. The Social Judgment Scheme model (Davis, 1996) provided a good fit of the group allocation, and suggested a mechanism for this overall downward shift in judgment. Normative (i.e. calibration) analyses, as well as subjective impressions (e.g. confidence, repeat judgments) favored relatively smaller allocations so that judgments made in large-small order, and judgments made in groups were arguably more defensible than were individual or small-large judgments. We discuss these strong agenda influences and their implications both for citizen panels and for theoretical research on group consensus.