The effect of choosing on confidence in choice

Sniezek, Janet A.; Paese, Paul W.; Switzer, Fred S.

doi:10.1016/0749-5978(90)90032-5

Cited by 200 publications

(107 citation statements)

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“…Several researchers have proposed that confidence in an answer is influenced more strongly by evidence that speaks for it than by evidence that speaks against it (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987;McKenzie, 1997;Sniezek, Paese, & Switzer, 1990). Thus, Koriat et al (1980) proposed that whereas the choice of an answer is based on the balance of evidence for and against each of the alternatives (Griffin & Tversky, 1992;McKenzie, 1997McKenzie, , 1998, confidence in the answer chosen is based on the attempt to justify that answer, which results in overweighting of the evidence that supports it.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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When confidence in a choice is independent of which choice is made

Koriat

2008

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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), participants chose an answer to two-alternative general-information questions and indicated their confidence in that answer. Whereas previous studies focused on the determinants of the choice and, consequently, on the confidence in that choice, the present study examined a component of subjective confidence that correlates with properties of the items itself, no matter which answer is chosen.The item-based approach to the study of metacognitive judgments has proved useful in the past. According to this approach, some insight into the processes underlying metacognitive judgments and their accuracy can be gained by investigating systematic differences between memory items. This approach is based on the assumption that memory questions differ reliably in characteristics that are pertinent to metacognitive judgments, and that normative data, aggregated across participants, provide clues to the processes that occur within participants. Thus, in Koriat and Lieblich's (1977) study of the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states, word definitions were found to differ reliably in terms of two orthogonal dimensions: their likelihood of suggesting the correct memory target, and the extent to which they evoke a feeling of knowing (FOK). The analysis of items in terms of these dimensions provided information about the processes underlying FOK and TOT states, and laid the groundwork for Koriat's (1993) accessibility model of FOK judgments. Similarly, general-information questions were found to differ reliably in two properties among participants who provided an answer, and these properties predicted the magnitude and accuracy of FOK judgments among participants who failed to provide an answer to these questions (Koriat, 1995). Also, using two-alternative general-information questions, has documented a systematic correlation between subjective confidence in the answer and the percentage of participants who chose that answer: Consensually chosen answers elicited stronger confidence than nonconsensual answers, regardless of whether they were correct or wrong, implying that confidence is diagnostic of the correctness of the answer only when the consensually endorsed answer is the correct answer, as is generally the case. When the consensual answer was the wrong answer ("deceptive"; see Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977), this answer was endorsed with stronger confidence. Similar findings were reported by Brewer and Sampaio (2006), who also used an item-based approach to study confidence in memory for sentences.The present study focuses on another item-based correlation that I have observed over the years across several sets of data. Consider the recent study of Koriat (2008) just mentioned: Participants answered 105 questions and expressed their confidence on a 50%-100% scale. The questions had been selected to represent a wide dispersion in terms of the likelihood that participants would choose the correct answer, so that for some questions the consensually chosen answer would be the wrong answer.For the present study, I reanaly...

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Of course, this should also be the case if the bias in favor of one of the answers has already developed during the search for pertinent considerations (Sniezek et al, 1990;Tsai, Klayman, & Hastie, in press).…”

Section: University Of Haifa Haifa Israelmentioning

confidence: 99%

When confidence in a choice is independent of which choice is made

Koriat

2008

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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“…For example, one can consider the overconfidence phenomenon in almanac question studies as a form of base rate neglect. Despite the fact that people know the fairly low relative frequency with which they are choosing the correct alternative (Gigerenzer, 1991;Sniezek et al, 1990), they continue to express high confidence that they have chosen the correct alternative on an item-byitem basis. The information they possess about the base rate with which they answer such questions correctly (i.e., their prior probability of answering a question correctly) seems to have little impact on their likelihood judgments in response to particular items.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As discussed presently, there are many other interesting aspects of external correspondence that may or may not be affected by a relative-frequency elicitation question. A final reason to study the effects of a relative-frequency question on external correspondence is research showing that people performing a general-knowledge task often estimate the number or percentage of general-knowledge questions they answered correctly during the experiment with a high degree of accuracy (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991;Sniezek, Paese, & Switzer, 1990). This suggests that people may have access to accurate relative-frequency information to which a relativefrequency elicitation question may draw their attention.…”

Section: External Correspondencementioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of a Relative-Frequency Elicitation Question on Likelihood Judgment Accuracy: The Case of External Correspondence

Price

1998

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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In three experiments, college students judged the likelihood that they chose the correct alternative for each of 40 two-alterna-tive, generalknowledge items. They responded either to a rela-tive-frequency elicitation question ("Out of 100 questions for which you felt this certain of the answer, how many would you answer correctly?") or to a probability elicitation question ("What is the probability that you chose the correct answer?"). Judg-ments in response to the relative-frequency elicitation question tended to be lower, exhibit less scatter, and express complete certainty less often than judgments in response to the probability elicitation question. Two types of explanation for these effects are considered. First, the effect of the relative-frequency elicitation question may be to reduce random response error in participants' likelihood judgments. Second, the relativefrequency elicitation question may encourage the use of frequency information and simpler algorithms for making likelihood judgments.Behavioral decision researchers have shown repeatedly that the way one person asks another for a judgment can have important effects on the judgment itself. These effects are typically referred to as framing effects (Yates, 1990). The present research concerns one such framing effect in the domain of likelihood judgment. Specifically, it concerns the effects of a relative-frequency elicitation question (e.g., "In 100 cases like this one, how many times would target event

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“…Further, accountability seems to decrease levels of overconfidence, such that overconfidence decreases if choice answers are observed (Sniezek et al, 1990). All else equal, the relative simplicity of the experiment, and the fact that subjects report choice answers to the experimenter (e.g.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food

Thunström

Nordström

Shogren

2015

Journal of Economic Psychology

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We examine consumer certainty of future preferences and overconfidence in predicting future preferences. We explore how preference certainty and overconfidence impact the option value to revise today's decisions in the future. We design a laboratory experiment that creates a controlled choice environment, in which a subject's choice set (over food snacks) is known and constant over time, and the time frame is short --subjects make choices for themselves today, and for one to two weeks ahead. Our results suggest that even for such a seemingly straightforward choice task, only 45 percent of subjects can predict future choices accurately, while stated certainty of future preferences (one and two weeks ahead) is around 80 percent. We define overconfidence in predicting future preferences as: the difference between actual accuracy at predicting future choices and stated certainty of future preferences. Our results suggest strong evidence of overconfidence. We find that overconfidence increases with the level of stated certainty of future preferences. Finally, we observe that the option value people attach to future choice flexibility decreases with overconfidence. Overconfidence in future preferences affects economic welfare because it says people have too much incentive to lock themselves into future suboptimal decisions.

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The effect of choosing on confidence in choice

Cited by 200 publications

References 12 publications

When confidence in a choice is independent of which choice is made

When confidence in a choice is independent of which choice is made

Effects of a Relative-Frequency Elicitation Question on Likelihood Judgment Accuracy: The Case of External Correspondence

Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food

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