How do people monitor their knowledge during acquisition? A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning (JOLs) is outlined, distinguishing 3 types of cues for JOLs: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. In 4 experiments using paired-associates learning, item difficulty (intrinsic) exerted similar effects of JOLs and recall. In contrast, the extrinsic factors of list repetition, item repetition within a list, and stimulus duration affected JOLs less strongly than recall, supporting the proposition that extrinsic factors are discounted in making JOLs. Although practice impaired calibration, increasing underconfidenee, it did improve resolution (i.e., the recail-JOL correlation). This improvement was seen to reflect a shift in the basis of JOLs with practice, from reliance on intrinsic factors, towards greater reliance on mnemonicbased heuristics. There has been a great deal of interest in recent years in the metacognitive processes that supervise and control various aspects of information processing and behavior (see
When people are allowed freedom to volunteer or withhold information, they can enhance the accuracy of their memory reports substantially relative to forced-report performance. A theoretical framework addressing the strategic regulation of memory reporting is put forward that delineates the mediating role of metamemorial monitoring and control processes. Although the enhancement of memory accuracy is generally accompanied by a reduction in memory quantity, experimental and simulation results indicate that both of these effects depend critically on (a) accuracy incentive and (b) monitoring effectiveness. The results are discussed with regard to the contribution of meta-memory processes to memory performance, and a general methodology is proposed that incorporates these processes into the assessment of memory-accuracy and memory-quantity performance.
Even when Ss fail to recall a solicited target, they can provide feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments about its availability in memory. Most previous studies addressed the question of FOK accuracy, only a few examined how FOK itself is determined, and none asked how the processes assumed to underlie FOK also account for its accuracy. The present work examined all 3 questions within a unified model, with the aim of demystifying the FOK phenomenon. The model postulates that the computation of FOK is parasitic on the processes involved in attempting to retrieve the target, relying on the accessibility of pertinent information. It specifies the links between memory strength, accessibility of correct and incorrect information about the target, FOK judgments, and recognition memory. Evidence from 3 experiments is presented. The results challenge the view that FOK is based on a direct, privileged access to an internal monitor.
People are often overconfident in evaluating the correctness of their knowledge. The present studies investigated the possibility that assessment of confidence is biased by attempts to justify one's chosen answer. These attempts include selectively focusing on evidence supporting the chosen answer and disregarding evidence contradicting it. Experiment 1 presented subjects with two-alternative questions and required them to list reasons for and against each of the alternatives prior to choosing an answer and assessing the probability of its being correct. This procedure produced a marked improvement in the appropriateness of confidence judgments. Experiment 2 simplified the manipulation by asking subjects first to choose an answer and then to list (a) one reason supporting that choice, (b) one reason contradicting it, or (c) one reason supporting and one reason contradicting. Only the listing of contradicting reasons improved the appropriateness of confidence. Correlational analyses of the data of Experiment 1 strongly suggested that the confidence depends on the amount and strength of the evidence supporting the answer chosen. One remarkable characteristic of human memory is its knowledge of its own content, Judgments of confidence in the correctness of recall and recognition performance are
Do we run away because we are frightened, or are we frightened because we run away? The authors address this issue with respect to the relation between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control. When self-regulation is goal driven, monitoring affects control processes so that increased processing effort should enhance feelings of competence and feelings of knowing. In contrast, when self-regulation is data driven, such feelings may be based themselves on the feedback from control processes, in which case they should decrease with increasing effort. Evidence for both monitoring-based control and control-based monitoring occurring even in the same situation is presented. The results are discussed with regard to the issue of the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior.Keywords: metacognition, subjective experience, monitoring, control, judgments of learning A long-standing issue in psychology and philosophy concerns the cause-and-effect relation between phenomenal experience and behavior (Baars, 1988;Bargh, 1997;Bless & Forgas, 2000;Flanagan, 1992;Mandler, 2002;Marcel, 1983aMarcel, , 1983b Marcel & Bisiach, 1988). Whereas many discussions in cognitive psychology assume that subjective experience can play a causal role in influencing behavior, recent findings lend credence to the idea that subjective experience may be based on the feedback from one's own behavior and thus follow rather than precede behavior. Indeed, in reviewing their own work, Kelley and Jacoby (1998) praised the insight owed to the James-Lange view of emotion, according to which "subjective experience can involve an attribution or unconscious inference about effects on performance and so follow from, rather than be responsible for, objective performance" (pp. 127-128). In this article we address the causal links between subjective experience and behavior within a restricted domain-that of metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control. We believe that our analysis and results can provide some insight into the general issue of the relation between subjective experience and behavior.The Cause-and-Effect Relation Between Subjective Experience and BehaviorMost of the discussions of the status of subjective experience in human behavior have centered on the causal role that consciousness might play in guiding behavior (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). The issue that has been addressed concerns the extent to which phenomenal consciousness affects behavior, in general, and "rational" action, in particular. In Posner and Snyder's (1975) conceptual framework, for example, controlled processes, as opposed to automatic processes, were seen to characterize conscious functioning. Block (1995) associated consciousness with the reflective pursuit of one's goals, arguing that without consciousness one loses the "rational control of action." In Schacter's (1989) model, the conscious system is assumed to function as the gateway to an executive control system that initiates and regulates voluntary action. Only activations that gain ac...
The authors examined the hypothesis that judgments of learning (JOL), if governed by processing fluency during encoding, should be insensitive to the anticipated retention interval. Indeed, neither item-by-item nor aggregate JOLs exhibited "forgetting" unless participants were asked to estimate recall rates for several different retention intervals, in which case their estimates mimicked closely actual recall rates. These results and others reported suggest that participants can access their knowledge about forgetting but only when theory-based predictions are made, and then only when the notion of forgetting is accentuated either by manipulating retention interval within individuals or by framing recall predictions in terms of forgetting rather than remembering. The authors interpret their findings in terms of the distinction between experience-based and theory-based JOLs.
How do people monitor the correctness of their answers? A self-consistency model is proposed for the process underlying confidence judgments and their accuracy. In answering a 2-alternative question, participants are assumed to retrieve a sample of representations of the question and base their confidence on the consistency with which the chosen answer is supported across representations. Confidence is modeled by analogy to the calculation of statistical level of confidence (SLC) in testing hypotheses about a population and represents the participant's assessment of the likelihood that a new sample will yield the same choice. Assuming that participants draw representations from a commonly shared item-specific population of representations, predictions were derived regarding the function relating confidence to inter-participant consensus and intra-participant consistency for the more preferred (majority) and the less preferred (minority) choices. The predicted pattern was confirmed for several different tasks. The confidence-accuracy relationship was shown to be a by-product of the consistency-correctness relationship: It is positive because the answers that are consistently chosen are generally correct, but negative when the wrong answers tend to be favored. The overconfidence bias stems from the reliability-validity discrepancy: Confidence monitors reliability (or self-consistency), but its accuracy is evaluated in calibration studies against correctness. Simulation and empirical results suggest that response speed is a frugal cue for self-consistency, and its validity depends on the validity of self-consistency in predicting performance. Another mnemonic cue-accessibility, which is the overall amount of information that comes to mind-makes an added, independent contribution. Self-consistency and accessibility may correspond to the 2 parameters that affect SLC: sample variance and sample size.
There has been unprecedented interest in recent years in questions pertaining to accuracy and distortion in memory. This interest, catalyzed in part by real-life problems, marks a significant departure from the quantity-oriented approach that has characterized much of traditional memory research. We outline a correspondence metaphor of memory underlying accuracy-oriented research, and show how the features of this metaphor are manifested across the disparate bodies of research reviewed here. These include work in the Gestalt tradition, spatial memory, memory for gist, schema theory, source monitoring, fluency misattributions, false recall and recognition, postevent misinformation, false memories, eyewitness research, and autobiographical memory. In examining the dynamics of memory accuracy, we highlight the importance of metacognitive monitoring and control processes. We end by discussing some of the methodological, theoretical, and metatheoretical issues inherent in accuracy-oriented research, attempting to prepare the groundwork for a more coherent psychology of memory accuracy.
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