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This paper analyses the role played by US economic assistance during the administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart in Brazil (-). It focuses on the negotiation and implementation of financial agreements associated with the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy's aid programme for Latin America. It demonstrates that the Alliance had a positive impact during Quadros' administration, providing substantial resources to the country and placing economic growth ahead of economic stabilisation as the principal criterion for aid. Circumstances changed, however, when João Goulart became president, resulting in serious funding constraints. The paper suggests that the main reason for this was political, specifically regarding Washington's perception of Goulart's links with communist groups. a break with the policy of previous administrations.  Throughout most of the s, Washington supported right-wing dictatorships in the region, played down the role of public funds for development and emphasised the need for rigorous economic stabilisation and inducements to private investment. The Cuban Revolution proved that this strategy could produce dangerous outcomes. As a more sustainable solution to the problem of leftist agitation, the Alliance for Progress responded by calling for the strengthening of progressive democratic regimes and an improvement in living standards, to be achieved by higher government spending, social reforms (including agrarian and tax reforms) and foreign aid. As Kennedy stated in his concluding remarks to the diplomats, without 'social change' and 'democracy', 'our dream will fail'. 

This paper analyses public opinion during the João Goulart government in Brazil (1961-1964), focusing on public perceptions on domestic and foreign policies. We employ a recently declassified public opinion survey conducted on behalf of United States Information Agency (USIA) in urban areas. We found that the Brazilian public opinion was somewhat coherent, supporting redistributive reforms domestically and a neutralist approach in foreign affairs.

Este artigo analisa o processo de formulação e de implementação dos acordos financeiros de maio de 1961 entre Brasil e Estados Unidos. Argumenta-se que a Aliança para o Progresso, o programa de ajuda econômica do governo Kennedy para a América Latina, teve um papel importante na garantia de substanciais recursos à administração Jânio Quadros. A implementação desses acordos, no entanto, evoluiu de modo bastante diferente após a subida de João Goulart ao poder em setembro de 1961, resultando em um contingenciamento de recursos ao governo brasileiro. Sugere-se que a principal razão para essa mudança não teria sido econômica, mas, sim, política, especialmente no que se refere aos contatos de Goulart com grupos identificados como comunistas por Washington.

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RESUMO Este artigo analisa as relações entre o presi dente João Goulart e as principais lideranças do movimento sindical urbano no início dos anos 1960, com foco nas eleições da mais importante entidade sindical oficial do país, a Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria (CNTI). Argumenta-se que o apoio de Goulart a uma chapa trabalhista-comunista para a entidade, em dezembro de 1961, foi es sencial para a formação o Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT), central sindical paralela que teve papel de liderança nas lutas sociais do período. Argumenta-se ainda que, em razão da crescente independência desses sindicalis tas - a partir de 1963 - Jango teria articulado (sem sucesso) estratégias para enfraquecê-los, primeiro visando criar uma central sindical al ternativa e, depois, apoiando uma chapa de oposição para as eleições da CNTI de janeiro de 1964. A derrota de Goulart em ambos episódios foi fundamental para a guinada do governo à esquerda, culminando no golpe de 1964.

o plano Trienal no contexto das relações entre Brasil e estados unidos (1962)(1963) feLipe pereirA Loureiro* The Three-Year Plan in the context of the US-Brazilian relations (1962)(1963). The paper analyses the US-Brazilian relations during the formulation and implementation of the Three-Year Plan by the government of João Goulart. The evidence suggests the limited economic assistance offered by the United States to Brazil, driven by political causes, played a major role in the Three-Year Plan's demise. It is argued that Goulart's links with the radical left, particularly with groups seen as communists by Washington, was the main reason behind US decision of blocking resources. The conclusions are relevant because scholars have emphasized domestic reasons only to explain the failure of the Three-Year Plan.