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This article analyses the politics of performance management in the United Kingdom, focusing on the extent to which a highly centralised Westminster majoritarian polity has encouraged the top-down control of public services. It does so by comparing the approaches to performance management that prevailed under the Labour Governments (1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010) and the Coalition (2010-15) to demonstrate the degree of continuity that exists between the ostensibly divergent approaches that each sought to develop. It particular, the which has resulted in a burgeoning disconnect betweenPresenting the results of an extensive programme of original empirical research, this article is therefore of significance for theories of performance management, and illuminates the connection between macro--

The role of legislatures in scrutinising executive patronage has received scant attention in the context of parliamentary democracy. This article addresses this lacuna by focusing on the parliamentary scrutiny of public appointments in the United Kingdom. Presenting the results of an extensive programme of research, it reveals how select committees have accrued increasing powers to challenge ministerial appointments, and how this has resulted in a series of unintended consequences that raise critical concerns regarding the overall added-value of preappointment scrutiny. The article is therefore of comparative significance for theories of legislative scrutiny in particular and executive-legislature dynamics more broadly.

The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe. Yet, in recent years a different account has emerged that focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics which limit the executive. It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent chapter of coalition government within the wider context of UK democratic evolution. To do so, the article draws L two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time. The article demonstrates that between over the course of the 2010-15 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition management. The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and beyond. Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship between institutional design and democratic performance. Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled-down to facilitate withincase analysis. Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the UK subject.

Flowing out of wider debates regarding representative democracy, the diversity of political institutions has gained salience. Normatively, it is suggested that it is simply unfair for white, middle‐aged males to dominate decision‐making structures. Instead it has been argued that representative diversity can enhance the legitimacy of political institutions and processes, whilst improving the quality and inclusivity of policy‐making. Although most of these arguments have been applied to elected institutions and their bureaucracies, they are also germane in the context of appointments to the boards of public bodies, as the work of these bodies and the decisions made by their board members impacts upon the everyday lives of citizens. Drawing upon original research conducted in the UK, this article argues that the capacity of political actors to make appointments to public boards offers an as yet unrealized democratic potential by offering more opportunities for social engagement and participation in public governance.

The issue of government capacity is at the heart of the governance narrative, and the emergence of an increasingly fragmented policy arena has been seen to result in a process of ‘hollowing-out’. Yet, despite nearly two decades of scholarship, the disjuncture between the increasing intricacy of the policy landscape and effectiveness of governments’ institutional responses suggests that the focus upon complexity and fragmentation within governance discourse risks neglecting the institutional continuity that continues to characterise the structures of government. This article addresses this lacuna by eschewing a focus upon exogenous factors to instead highlight the relationship between intra-government capacity and the resultant capacity of governments to steer the broader policy terrain through a case study of the Labour government's response to climate change. Climate change cuts across traditional bureaucratic lines and challenges established ways of working, and embodies many of the challenges associated with the governance narrative. However, this article presents a range of evidence to suggest that the government's intra-government approach to climate change has been incoherent, with tools being mapped onto existing governing structures with seemingly little consideration for institutional fit, which reflects the prevailing influence of traditional governing norms. This article therefore argues that an ‘intra-governance cycle’ has emerged, as the unwillingness of the government to fundamentally appraise the extent that its institutional structures are fit-for-purpose vis-à-vis the challenges of modern governance has rendered these challenges without adequate resolution, and with the potential for governance failure.

The concept of ‘governance’ denotes a shift in the distribution of power within and beyond modern democracies and state systems. At the heart of this shift lies a normative preference for disaggregating large bureaucratic state structures into smaller, more flexible, single-purpose organisational units. This process poses distinct questions regarding the capacity of elected politicians to control or coordinate this sphere of delegated governance. The central argument of this article is as simple as ABC (that is, agencies, boards and commissions): patronage is a critical political resource for elected politicians that should not automatically be derided as corrupt, unfair or nepotistic.

Constitutional reform in the United Kingdom is a story frequently framed around the narratives of missed opportunities, executive intransigence and institutional stickiness. Yet in times of flux and uncertainty, matters of the constitution can scale the political agenda at breakneck speed; and as the architecture of the UK teeters on the precipice of potentially fundamental upheaval, it is crucial to locate recent events within the broader history of constitutional reform in order to tease apart the dynamics of stasis and change. This article responds by offering the first complete in-depth analysis of the 2010-15 Coalition Government's record on the constitution, focusing on the gap between rhetoric and reform, and the way in which constitutional traditions have confounded the ability to effectively manage the tensions that exist within the UK's uneasy settlement. In doing so, the article sets out the institutional and ideational factors that have influenced attitudes towards constitutional reform, in particular focusing on the way in which dilemmas of office have confounded meaningful attempts to alter Britain's constitutional fabric. It argues that three critical factors together explain the Coalition's record on the constitution: the clash of constitutional philosophies within the Coalition; the dilemmas with which the Liberal Democrats were confronted in the transition from opposition to government; and, the extent to which the governing norms of constitution effectively neuter attempts to its reform. The findings of this article are therefore salient and significant, providing valuable lessons regarding the tenability of the UK's extant constitutional architecture and the capacity of the Conservative Government to successfully manage and vent the myriad of pressures upon it.Key words: constitution; constitutional reform; coalition government; institutions; ideology 2 Matters of the constitution in the United Kingdom (UK) were once renowned for the sheer paucity of popular and political interest, earning the issue of constitutional reform the unfortunate label of 'a topic for anoraks ' (Bogdanor, 2014). Yet in times of flux and uncertainty, matters of the constitution can scale the political agenda at breakneck speed. This has been readily apparent in recent months as the implications of the 'no' vote in the Scottish independence referendum unfolded and precipitated a range of constitutional conundrums regarding the asymmetry of the Union, which has led commentators to argue that 'the tangled British constitution is again on the verge of significant, unplanned change' (The Times, 2014). Indeed, constitutional affairs were centre-stage in the run-up to the 2015 general election, the debate being dominated by issues including Scotland's relationship with Westminster and Britain's place in Europe; and the newly elected Conservative Government has pledged a package of reforms that could simultaneously witness the repatriation of sovereignty and the dispersal of power across the Union. As the architectur...