The watchdogs of ‘Washminster’ – parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage in the UK

Abstract

The role of legislatures in scrutinising executive patronage has received scant attention in the context of parliamentary democracy. This article addresses this lacuna by focusing on the parliamentary scrutiny of public appointments in the United Kingdom. Presenting the results of an extensive programme of research, it reveals how select committees have accrued increasing powers to challenge ministerial appointments, and how this has resulted in a series of unintended consequences that raise critical concerns regarding the overall added-value of preappointment scrutiny. The article is therefore of comparative significance for theories of legislative scrutiny in particular and executive-legislature dynamics more broadly.

Parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage: The relationship between institutional norms, reputation and accountability

“…Through this analysis, the article makes four key contributions. First, by systematically appraising the institutional determinants of select committee behaviour, it extends and deepens previous analyses of pre‐appointment scrutiny at Westminster (Hazell et al , ; Flinders and Geddes ; Matthews and Flinders ; Hazell ). Second, by highlighting the way that select committees mobilize institutional norms for reputational purposes, it dovetails with scholarship that has examined the sources of select committee powers (e.g., Benton and Russell ; Fisher ; Bates et al ; Russell and Gover ; Matthews ); and offers a further counterpoint to comparative scholarship that has typically regarded select committees as toothless and weak (e.g., Mattson and Strøm ; Powell ; Saalfeld ).…”

“…As the UK is the only parliamentary democracy whose national legislature exercises a formal role in scrutinizing executive patronage, the case provides a fertile testing ground for such arguments; and a handful of studies have examined the extent that Westminster's select committees have acted as a bulwark against executive excess (Hazell et al , ; Flinders and Geddes ; Matthews and Flinders ; Hazell ). These studies paint a mixed picture.…”

“…These studies paint a mixed picture. There is general agreement that while formal opportunities for select committees to intervene in appointments appear limited, pre‐appointment hearings ‘entail a strong anticipatory effect or preventative influence that permeates the whole appointments process’ (Matthews and Flinders , p. 173). However, there remains disagreement about the motivation of committee members.…”

“…However, while such frustrations are keenly felt, focusing on the limits of their formal powers risks overlooking the informal and anticipatory ways that committees can control executive patronage. Put simply, ‘an absence of conflict does not necessarily indicate an absence of committee influence’ (Hazell et al , p. 228), and existing studies have highlighted a ‘deterrent effect’ (Matthews and Flinders ) whereby ‘ministers will be reluctant to put forward weak candidates who will not pass muster’ (Hazell , p. 234). To critically appraise how select committees scrutinize executive patronage, it is therefore necessary to look beyond the ‘obvious traps’ (Hazell et al , p. 228) of formal powers and visible influence.…”

“…In particular, it is necessary to determine whether pre‐appointment hearings are part of the ‘engrained culture of consensus’ (Russell and Benton , p. 37) that is predicated on avoiding the adversarialism and partisanship of the Main Chamber. However, while existing studies have examined the political character of the (relatively infrequent) formal divisions over a candidate's endorsement (e.g., Matthews and Flinders ; Hazell et al ), none have examined the extent to which the conduct of the hearing itself is differentiated along party lines. To determine whether this is the case, it is therefore necessary to ask:RQ3: Do select committees act cohesively when scrutinizing executive appointments?…”